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NOTES
Statutory Standing to Review Administrative Action
Any person seeking judicial review of action taken by an administrative
body will encounter numerous obstacles before obtaining a consideration
of his case on the merits. He must show that the agency action is of the
kind that is reviewable by the courts, i. e., that it is a "reviewable order." 1
It must be reviewable in this particular forum, for if there are statutory
provisions for review they are usually held to be exclusive.2 There is the
requirement that the administrative order be a "final order", and not
merely interlocutory action, 3 and available administrative remedies must
have been exhausted. 4 But even when all these requirements are met
(and the discussion which follows will consider that they have been met)
the petitioner must show that he as an individual has "standing" to attack
the order.5 It is this last consideration with which this Note will deal. 6
The Constitution limits judicial review by our federal courts to cases
or controversies, and in certain constitutional areas gives an absolute right
to judicial review of agency action. 7 Between these constitutional limits
of maximum and minimum, there is room for considerable legislative discretion in granting or withholding review. 8 This was established very
early in the history of administrative law when the court said:
"There are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which
Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts
of the United States, as it may deem proper."
1. E.g., American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U. S.401 (1940); United
States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R., 273 U. S.299 (1927) ; Hearst Radio v. FCC,

167 F. 2d 225 (D. C. Cir. 1948) ; cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States,

316 U. S.407 (1942). See 31 GEo. L.J. 40 (1942).
2.Venner v.Michigan Central R. R., 271 U. S.127 (1926); Lambert Run Coal
Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 258 U. S. 377 (1922); Monocacy Broadcasting Co. v.
Prall, 90 F.2d 421 (D.C.Cir. 1937) ; Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 78 F.2d 729 (D.C.
Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.624 (1935) ; Godfrey v. Building Comm'r of Boston, 263 Mass. 589, 161 N. E. 819 (1928) ; cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United
States, supra note 1; De Blasiis v. Bartell, 143 Pa. Super. 485, 18 A. 2d 478 (1941).
3. United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R., 273 U. S.299 (1927) ; Lownsbury v. SEC. 151 F. 2d 217 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Gilbert v. SEC, 146 F. 2d 513 (7th Cir.
1944).
4. E. g., Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. v. Risty, 276 U. S. 567, 575 (1928) ; Red
River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F. 2d 282 (D. C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305
U. S. 625 (1938) ; Berger, Exhawtion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L. J. 981
(1939) ; Note, 27 GEo. L. J. 783 (1939).
5. Petitioner may have "standing" to review one part of the order but not another.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. FPC, 113 F. 2d 281 (5th Cir. 1940).
6. Review of the action of federal agencies will be principally considered.
7. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936) ; Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) ; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922). For a
discussion of the effect of the "case or controversy" requirement on standing, see
Davis, Standinq to Review and to Enforce Administrative Action, 49 COL. L. REv.
759-62 (1949).
8. REP. A Tfry GEN. Comm. AD. PROC. 80 (1941).
9. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284
(U. S. 1855). See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 49-62 (1932); Stephens, Ross
Essay, 25 A. B. A. J. 543, 546 (1939).
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Although Congress may, therefore, prevent review altogether or grant
it to particular persons only, it has rarely done either. Nor has it attempted in most cases to define carefully the class of persons who could
seek review of administrative action.' 0 The statute creating the agency
may be silent about the area of review," or it may limit it to those against
whom the order runs,' 2 but the most common provision is that "persons
aggrieved," or "parties in interest," or "persons adversely affected" may
seek review of orders promulgated under the authority of the statute.13
It is this latter type of statute with which this Note is principally concerned. 13 b The actual enlargement and limitation of the area of review
have been in a large measure determined by the courts. The development
has been gradual, 4from case to case, in response to the pressure of particular situations.'
The early cases laid down the doctrine that a person seeking review
of administrative action had to show that it violated or threatened to violate a legally protected right of his,' 5 and that a "general concern for
obedience of the law" was not sufficient.' 6 It was also recognized that there
was no necessity of showing injury to a common law right of the petitioner, since rights may be created by statute which did not theretofore
10. REP. ATT'Y GEN. CoMm. AD. PROC. 83 (1941).
11. E. g., Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 STAT. 220 (1913), 28 U. S. C. §47 (1946).
12. E. g., Agricultural Marketing Act, 49 STAT. 760 (1935), as amended, 50 STAT.

246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. § 608c(15) (1946).
13a. Review of action of the following federal agencies is governed by statutes
containing such language: Securities & Exchange Commn--54 STAT. 844 (1940), 15
U. S. C. § 80a-42 (a) (1946) (Investment Company Act of 1940) (person or party
aggrieved); 54 STAT. 855 (1940), 15 U. S. C. § 80b-13 (a) (1946) (Investment Ad-

visers Act of 1940) (person or party aggrieved) ; 49 STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U. S. C.
§ 79x (1946) (Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935) (person or party aggrieved) ; 48 STAT. 901, 926 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78y (1946) (Securities Exchange
Act of 1934) (party aggrieved) ; 48 STAT. 80 (1933), 48 STAT. 926 (1934), 15 U. S.

C. § 77i (a) (1946) (Securities Act of 1933) (person aggrieved). National Labor
Relationts Board-49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (f) (1946) (National Labor
Relations Act) (person aggrieved) ; 52 STAT. 1065 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 210(a)

(1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938) (person aggrieved). FederalPower Cominission-49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §8251 (a, b) (1946) (Federal Power Act)
(party aggrieved) ; 52 STAT. 831 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717r(b) (1946) (Natural Gas
Act) (party aggrieved) ; 50 STAT. 85 (1937) (expired 1943, 57 STAT. 84) (Bituminous Coal Act of 1937) (party aggrieved). Civil Aeronautics Authority-52 STAT.
1024 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §646(a) (1946) (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938) (person
disclosing substantial interest). Office of Price Administration--56 STAT. 31 (1942),
50 U. S. C. § 924(e) (1946) (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942) (person aggrieved). U. S. Civil Service Commission--54 STAT. 768 (1940), 18 U. S. C. § 611(c)
(1946)

(Hatch Act)

(party aggrieved).

Federal Communications Commission-

48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 402(b) (2) (1946) (Communications Act of
1934) (person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected). Interstate Commerce Commission-41 STAT. 477 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 1(20) (1946) (Transportation
Act of 1920) (any party in interest). Federal Security Administrator-52 STAT. 1055

(1938), 21 U. S. C. § 371 (f) (1946) (Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act) (any
person who will be adversely affected by such order if placed in effect).
13b. The consensus of opinion seems to be that the Federal Administrative Procedure Act is simply declaratory of existing law.
14. REP. Ar'y GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 75 (1941).
15. See, e. g., Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U. S. 249,

255-57 (1930) ; Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 487, 495 (E.
D. Va. 1935). This was based on analogy to standing to attack the constitutionality
of federal statutes. E. g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923) ; Muskrat

v. United States, 219 U. S.346 (1911).
16. Western Pacific California R. R. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S. 47, 51
(1931).
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exist.' 7 Though it was apparently treated as a constitutional requirement,18 the breadth and indefinability of a "legal injury" or a "direct
private independent legal injury" gave the courts considerable discretion
in applying the doctrine. It appears that the question of "legal injury"
was decided after determining whether, on the basis of more practical considerations, it was desirable to grant review in each case. In fact the
Supreme Court recently abandoned the requirement of "private legal injury" when it found that application of it would prevent review which it
felt was desirable. 19
The validity of analogies to cases involving a complainant's standing
to contest the constitutionality of a federal statute is doubtful. The reluctance of the courts to pass on the constitutionality of statutes may place a
greater burden on such a complainant in showing a "legal injury" than
he has when merely contesting an agency order.20
It must be obvious at the outset from the variety of provisions and
policies of the statutes under which agencies operate, and the varying effect
of different administrative orders on third persons, that there can be no
general definition laid down as to who is an "aggrieved person." No attempt will be made in this Note to arrive at any such solution. The purpose is rather to illustrate various practical considerations which lead the
courts to deny standing to review in one case and to grant it in another.
The starting point in determining who has standing to review is the
statute itself, the evil it was intended to remedy, its legislative history, and
21
the particular section involved as illuminated by its tenor taken as a whole.
The main consideration underlying judicial determination of this question
has been an attempt to cooperate with the legislature in achieving the ultimate purpose of the particular statute under which the agency action was
taken, while at the same time protecting individual interests as much as
possible.
FACTORS LEADING TO THE GRANTING OF REVIEW

Making Sure Someone Can Review.-Even though the functions which
can be performed by the courts in judicial review are fairly limited, its
potential availability has definite effects on the procedure, efficiency and
attitude of the administrative body.22 When the statute has been silent
as to resort to the courts it has frequently been held that Congress did
not intend to preclude review altogether; 23 therefore when the statute pro17. See Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 311 U. S. 470, 485 (1941);
Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212, 225 (1905) ; Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F. 2d 212,
219 (D. C. Cir. 1939). "Except in special cases, . . . judicial review . . . is
appropriate whether the applicant seeks protection of a constitutional right or of a
statutory or common-law right, privilege, or bounty." REP. Anr'y GEN. Comm. AD.
PRoc.84 (1941).
18. See, e. g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S.113, 132 (1940) ; Ex-Cell-O
Corp. v. Chicago, 115 F. 2d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 1940).
19. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S.470 (1940).
20. Compare American Can Co. v. Milk Control Board, 313 Mass. 156, 46 N. E.
2d 542 (1943), with Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Chicago, 115 F. 2d 627 (7th Cir. 1940) and
Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U. S. 517 (1939), with Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d
694 (2d Cir. 1943).

21. See Mr.Justice Frankfurter, dissenting inStark v. Wickard, 321 U. S.288,
311-13 (1944).

22. REP.

AT-r'y GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 75-79 (1941) ; Stephens, Ross Essay, 25

A. B. A. J. 543, 549 (1939).
23. E. g., Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309 (1944). But cf. Switchman's
Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943).
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vides machinery for review the courts should at least keep the way open
for someone to review.
Certainly, then, an important issue is whether, after denial of one complainant's standing anyone else would be in a position to challenge the
order. This is well illustrated by the famous case of Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brotfiers Radio Station.24 The problem,
which had been hotly contested in a group of cases arising within a short
period of time, 25 was whether an existing station claiming injury through
competition from the granting of a license to a new station was an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of the Communications Act of 1934.26
The Supreme Court held that, while the Commission was not bound to
give controlling weight to economic injury through competition to existing
stations in granting or withholding licenses, financial injury through competition was sufficient to qualify an existing licensee to review an order
granting a license to a new station. In reaching this result, the Court
was faced with the long line of cases holding that a person has no standing to sue to set aside an agency order merely in the public interest, but
must show an invasion of an "independent legal right" of his own.2 7 We
have recognized this as merely a label, but in this case the Court could
not justifiably apply it and still permit review. The Act was framed
solely in terms of the public interest. Its policy was that the "field of
broadcasting is one of free competition," and that "no person is to have
anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of
a new license." In view of this it logically followed that injury through
competition would be damnum absque injuria. Nevertheless the Court
granted review and established the new doctrine that in certain cases persons may seek review of administrative orders as representatives of the
public interest, or as they were later dubbed, "king's proctors," 28 or
"private Attorney Generals." 29 Why was the Court so interested in
giving standing to this petitioner that it was willing to establish a new
concept? A logical explanation is that denial of review to this petitioner
would have practically precluded review at all, would have deprived the
"aggrieved person" section of the statute of any meaning, and the courts
of any effective control over the FCC. Justice Roberts refers to this by
saying: 30
"Congress may have been of opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license would be the only person having sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate courts
errors of law in the action of the commission in granting the license."
24. 309 U. S. 470 (1940).
25. Florida Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 109 F. 2d 668 (D. C. Cir. 1939) ; WOKO,
Inc. v. FCC, 109 F. 2d 665 (D. C. Cir. 1939) ; Yankee Network, Inc. v. FCC, 107 F.

2d 212 (D. C. Cir. 1939); Sanders Brothers Radio Station v. FCC, 106 F. 2d
321 (D. C. Cir. 1939); Great Western Broadcasting Ass'n v. FCC, 94 F. 2d 244
(1937).

But cf. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. FCC, 76 F. 2d 439, 442 (D. C. Cir. 1935) ;

WGN v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 68 F. 2d 432, 433 (D. C. Cir. 1933). Note, 8 GEo.
L. REv. 826 (1940) ; 53 HARV. L. Rav. 131 (1939).
26. 48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 402(b) (2) (1946).

WAs H.

27. See text at notes 15-19.
28. See Judge Edgerton concurring, in Colorado Radio Corp. v. FCC, 118 F. 2d
24, 28 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
29. See Judge Frank in Associated Industries of New York v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d

694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
30. Supra note 24 at 477. This has been interpreted as not intended to limit re-

view to those financially injured. See National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 132 F. 2d
545, 547 (D. C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U. S. 239 (1943).
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The same reasoning has been followed to justify review by stations alleging objectionable electrical interference from a proposed new station.8 '
Decisions under similar statutes have been influenced by judicial attempts to keep the way open for someone to review. In Parker v. Fleming,3 2 the Supreme Court held that a tenant was aggrieved by an order of
the area Price Administrator authorizing his landlord to begin eviction proceedings. In the course of the opinion the Court says, "if these tenants can,, 83
not 'protest' this order issued under these regulations no one can ...
84
Under the same statute, the Emergency Court of Appeals permitted review of an order allegedly unlawfully denying a subsidy payment to the
complainant, saying, "It is inadmissible to put upon the phrase 'any person subject to any provision' of a regulation . . . an interpretation which
would make it impossible for anyone to invoke our jurisdiction in this
type of case." 3 5 And although the opinions do not refer to it, it seems
clear that the same thing led the courts to hold that existing licensees
had standing to bring suit to enjoin extension of railway 3 and gas 8
lines into areas already served by them.
Encouraging Participationin Agency Hearings.-Many administrative bodies are under constant pressure from certain vested interest groups,
and it has been noted that they often begin, after a time, to think along
the same lines as the activity they regulate.3
The surest method of
combating this and of achieving the ultimate aim and policy of the statute
is to make sure that each of the conflicting interests involved has been
considered by the agency in formulating a given rule or order. The
courts may foster this end by holding that due process, or the statute,
require the agency to give formal notice to each class, and to permit intervention upon request of a member of the class.3 9 But the public interest may well require not only that these groups be given formal notice
and the right to participate if they so desire, but also that each of these
classes be actually encouraged to take part in the agency hearing. For
instance, it may be considered desirable in the interest of the public as a
whole that the knowledge and viewpoint of shippers, competing carriers,
and consumers be represented at a hearing before the ICC considering a
change in freight rates. There may be little incentive to a shipper to
spend the time and money required to participate in the hearing when
he knows that it is the end of the road for him and that he will have
no standing to review the rate order if it turns out to be adverse to
his interests. Therefore, to encourage his participation in the hearing
(having decided that it is in the public interest that the interest he repre31. FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U. S. 239 (1943); Woodmen of the
World v. FCC, 105 F. 2d 75 (D. C. Cir. 1939).
32. 329 U. S. 531 (1947).
33. Id. at 537. The statute provided that a person aggrieved by a denial of his
"protest" of an order could review.

Only persons "subject to" an order could "pro-

test" it.
34. 56 STAT. 31 (1942), 50 U. S. C. §924 (a) (1946).
35. Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, 151 F. 2d 337 (Em. Ct. App. 1945).
36. Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382 (1932);
Western Pacific California R. R. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S.47 (1931).
37. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. FPC, 113 F. 2d 281 (5th Cir. 1940).
38. HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 178 (1936) ;
FESLER, THE INDEPENDENCE OF STATE REGULATORY AGENTS 70 (1942).
39. See, generally, GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS

400-428 (2d ed. 1947) ; Oberst, Parties to Administrative Proceedings, 40 Mica. L.
Rzv. 378 (1941).
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sents should take part in the hearing), the court should give him the
added incentive of knowing that he will be able to obtain judicial review
of the order in case it turns out to be adverse to him.
Two things must be made clear. First, the purpose of this theory
is not to encourage appeals by all persons who happen to dislike a particular agency rule, order or regulation. It is intended rather to make
sure that the important conflicting interests will be brought to the attention
of the commission, so that the order will be based on an adequate knowledge of all the facts and circumstances which the commission should consider in the interest of the public generally. Secondly, this is not meant
to imply that the criterion which should guide the courts in determining
standing to review is whether or not the petitioner had sufficient interest
to be admitted as a party before the agency.40 The agency may well permit
participation by persons who, for other reasons, 4 1 should not be given
standing to review. The purpose of this theory is not to guarantee review
to all persons who were parties before the agency, but to guarantee it to
certain persons who, it is felt, should take part in hearings.
Statutes Intended to Protect Certain Interests.-When the statute
as a whole, or the particular section under which an order is promulgated,
shows that it was intended to protect certain interests, the representatives
of those interests should be entitled to review in the absence of overriding conflicting considerations. Examples of this are numerous and only
a few will be mentioned.
The Bituminous Coal Act contained several provisions which showed
that one of its purposes was the protection of consumers. 42 In Associated
Industries of New York v. Ickes, 43 the Second Circuit, distinguishing
numerous cases under different statutes which had denied consumers standing to review rate orders, 44 held that a consumers' membership corporation was an aggrieved party with standing to review rate orders of the
coal commission. Judge Frank says that "such a statute . . . should
surely be construed in such a way as not to blot out all protection to consumers." 45 Some reference should be made here to a novel suggestion
made in this case by Judge Frank. He states that the over-all policy
of Congress and the courts has been to foster competition by discouraging
monopolies, and when Congress expressly excepts a particular field from
this policy by regulating rates and reducing competition, this removes the
ordinary protectionfwhich competition gives to consumers, shippers, etc.
In such cases, offsetting protection should be given to these groups by
permitting them to review orders of the commission. He cites no an40. See text at notes 74-80.
41. See text at notes 55-73.
42. 50 STAT. 77, 80 (1937). Section 411(a) provided that minimum prices proposed as a basis for coordination "shall have due regard to the interest of the consuming public," and § 4 11(c) referred to protection of the "consumer of coal against
unreasonably high prices therefor."
43. 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
44. Id. at 706. The court placed great emphasis on the absence of a section providing for review by "aggrieved" persons in those statutes. See also Queensborough
Farms Products Co. v. Wickard, 137 F. 2d 969, 978 (2d Cir. 1943). Conclusion that
the existence of such a section indicates an intention that the courts be more liberal
in granting review is justified. But there seems to be little justification for the current trend to apply the "King's Proctor" doctrine of the Sanders Brothers case to every
statute with such language. See, e. g., Grace v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 154 F. 2d
271 (2d Cir. 1946).
45. Supra note 43 at 705.
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it is suspected
thority for this, but the theory has considerable merit 4and
6
that it may have influenced the decisions of the courts.
Certainly one of the things which influenced the decision of the Supreme Court in Parker v. Fleming 47 was the fact that certain sections
of the Price Control Act were intended to protect tenants from payment
48
Again,
of excessive rents and eviction without compliance with the law.
of
the
protection
the
ICC
was
creation
of
for
the
the
main
purposes
one of
49
The
shippers and consumers from excessive and discriminatory rates.
courts have consistently held that shippers 50 had standing to attack specific rate orders (even though there was no provision providing for review
of such orders by "aggrieved parties"), and that states and state agencies
51
Similarly, the
could review them to protect the interests of consumers.
that
one of its purstates
Public Utility Holding Company Act expressly
poses is the protection of investors, 52 and many of its orders deal directly with the internal affairs of corporations. Under this statute the
53
courts have been unusually liberal in granting review to shareholders.
When Petiiioner's Standing is Uncontested.-In numerous cases a
person will be permitted to appeal with no discussion of his standing in
54
The
court, though it would appear that his right there is questionable.
explanation of this in most cases is simply that the agency did not contest his standing. Realizing that an attempt to support an order on the
the ground that the petitioner lacks standing to object to it creates the
impression on the court and the public that the administrator lacks sufficient confidence in his action to defend its substance, agencies will naturally
prefer to stand by their action on the merits. In fact in most cases it
would appear to be good agency policy not to object to the standing of
the petitioner, except in the case of appeals which are felt to be merely
dilatory or harassing in nature, or unduly to slow down the administrative
process. The good will and confidence of the courts and the public are
necessary to effective administrative functioning.
FAcTORS LEADING TO LIMITATION OF REVIEW

We have found that the main consideration underlying the determination of who is an aggrieved person is the attempt of the judiciary
46. It has been noted that the courts tend to "veer in the direction of maintaining
a competitive equilibrium." Goldman, Standing to Challenge Orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, 9 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 648, 666 (1941).
47. Supra note 32. Accord, United States v. Public Utility Comm'n of District
of Columbia, 151 F. 2d 609 (D. C. Cir. 1945).
48. Id. at 536-37. See Snyder v. Reshenk, 131 Conn. 252, 258, 38 A. 2d 803, 806
(1944) ; 56 STAT. 27, 28 (1942), 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 902(b,d), 904(b) (1946).
49. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 54 STAT. 899 (1940), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 476 (1935) ; Anchor
Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928), rev'd as moot, 279
U. S. 812 (1929) : McLean Lumber Co. v. United States, 237 Fed. 460 (E. D. Tenn.
1916).
51. Tennessee v. United States, 284 Fed. 371, 374 (M. D. Tenn. 1922), rev'd on
merits, 262 U. S. 318 (1923) ; see ICC v. Oregon-Washington R. R., 288 U. S. 14, 24
(1932).
52. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79a (1946).
53. Compare, e. g., American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U. S. 385 (1945);
Okin v. SEC. 143 F. 2d 945 (2d Cir. 1944). affd, 325 U. S. 385 (1945) ; Lawless v.
SEC, 105 F. 2d 574 (1st Cir. 1939), with Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. United States,
281 U. S.479 (1930).
54. E. g., Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U. S. 624 (1945) ; Colorado v. United States,
271 U. S. 153 (1926) ; United States v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533 (1924) (ICC) ;
Todd v. SEC, 137 F. 2d 475 (6th Cir. 1943) ; International Ass'n of Machinists v.
NLRB, 110 F. 2d 29 (D. C. Cir. 1939) ; Head-of-the-Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
84 F. 2d 396 (D. C. Cir. 1936).
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to foster the effective administration of legislative policy. 5 In view of
this it logically follows that where granting review will endanger the
effective carrying out of the policy of the Act, the court will be likely to
deny it. If granting review to a petitioner will open the way for a flood
of appeals resulting in hamstringing effective administration of the Act
and overloading the court dockets, the court will be reluctant to grant it.
When Petitioner is Adequately Represented by Others.-This consideration is especially pertinent when the interests of the petitioner are
being adequately represented by someone else. 56 In American Power
& Light Co. V. SEC,5 7 where the Court granted review to a stockholder
even though the corporation was already reviewing the order, because
their interests differed in some respects, Justice Roberts stated, "There
may be situations in which the two interests [of the corporation and its
stockholders] are the same and where consequently the grievance ought
not to support two proceedings identical in character." 15 It was not
long before the Court was confronted with such a situation, and held
that a parent corporation had no standing to sue to set aside an order
of the ICC denying a license to its wholly owned subsidiary to operate as
a contract carrier, when the latter was already contesting the order.5 9
Judge Frank, in the Associated Industries case, distinguishes several cases
in which intervention in a suit to review rate orders was denied consumers
on the ground that the state attorney general and public utility commission were already adequately representing their interests. 60 In L. Singer
& Sons v. Union Pacific R. R., 6 1 the Court held that a city and its commission merchants were not "parties in interest" under the Transportation
Act of 1920 62 and therefore had no standing to enjoin the extension of
railway lines to serve a rival produce area. The court pointed out that
"to allow any private interest to thresh out the complicated questions . . .
1
is to invite dislocations of the scheme which Congress has devised. .... ,,.
is
not
the
court
when
Appeals.-Even
The Danger of Overfrequent
supported by the consideration that someone else is adequately representing the petitioner it will frequently deny review to prevent hamstringing appeals.0 4 In United States Cane Sugar Refiner's Ass'n v. McNutt,65 sugar refiners were held not persons "adversely affected" 06 by a
55. See text at note 21 et seq.
56. Not infrequently the courts state that the interests of a petitioner are adequately represented by the agency. See, e. g., United States v. Merchants & Manufacturers Ass'n of Sacramento, 242 U. S.178, 188 (1916) ; Parker v. Porter, 154 F. 2d
830, 834 (Em. Ct. Ap). 1946). rev'd sub nora. Parker v. Fleming, 329 U. S. 531
(1946). Since this argument can be applied to prevent review in almost every case,
it obviously is used only as a tool to prevent too-numerous appeals.
57. 325 U. S.385 (1945).
58. Id. at 390.
59. Schenley Corp. v. United States, 326 U. S.432 (1945) ; cf. Pittsburgh & W.
Va. Ry.v. United States, 281 U. S.479 (1930).
60. Supra note 43 at 706.
61. 311 U. S.295 (1940).
62. 41 STAT.478 (1920), 49 U. S.C.§ 1(20) (1946).
63. Supra note 61 at 307.
64. This is the only plausible explanation of the decision of the court in Anthony
v. NLRB, 132 F. 2d 620 (9th Cir. 1942), that an individual employee was not aggrieved
by an order of the NLRB which allegedly deprived him of reemployment and back
pay due.
65. 138 F. 2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943).
66. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 52 STAT. 1055 (1938), 21 U. S. C.
§371(f) (1946).
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regulation of the Federal Security Administrator permitting the use of dextrose or corn syrup instead of sugar in canning certain fruits, without so
labelling the product. The court felt that if it permitted this petitioner to
review on the basis of such "a tenuous likelihood of injury . . . opportunity for maintaining petitions would be so unlimited as to be a serious
threat to the practical administration of the statute." 67
When the Public Interest Requires Quick Agency Action.-In some
cases the courts deny standing to review not from the fear that granting
it will result in multiplicity of appeals, but because it is felt that any
review at all will prevent quick agency action which an emergency requires. In the face of a long line of decisions holding that shippers had
standing to attack specific ICC rate orders,68 the court held in Algoma
Coal Co. v. United States6 9 that shippers had no standing to review an
order granting railroads a general rate increase. The decision has been
explained by the fact that "to have allowed shippers of one commodity
to assail the order would have meant that emergency relief via a general
order could not be effectively used by the Commission . . . threatening
the entire transportation system of the nation." 70 Likewise, the emergency
Court of Appeals denied review to the tenant in Parker v. Fleming 71

largely because it felt that review would prevent the Price Administrator
from giving the quick relief which the emergency required. The Supreme
Court reversed, apparently because it felt that this danger was not72great
enough to overshadow the threatened harm to the individual tenant.
The argument demonstrating the "horrendous possibilities" of a flood
of appeals does not bear equal weight with all courts and in all cases, and
has occasionally been expressly rejected. 73 It would appear that in most
cases the courts must be thoroughly convinced that over-frequent appeals
will block effective agency action, before they will vary from their usual
policy of protecting private rights and the public interest by permitting
broad review of agency action, especially when the statute expressly provides for it.
THE IMPORTANCE OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS A PARTY
BEFORE THE AGENCY
The fact that a petitioner was not a party to the proceedings culminating in the order does not preclude him from obtaining review of it,74
unless the statute expressly so provides.7 5 Conversely, the fact that he
was admitted as a party by the agency does not in itself give him standing to review. Dictum by Justice Brandeis in The Chicago Junction Case 76
67. Supra note 65 at 120. See also Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio
Comm'n, 66 F. 2d 220, 222 (D. C. Cir. 1933).
68. Cases cited note 50 supra.
69. 11 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935).
70. Goldman, Standing to Challenge Orders of the ICC, 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
648, 663 (1941).
71. Sub nom.Parker v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 830 (Em. Ct. App. 1946).
72. Parker v. Fleming, 329 U. S. 531 (1947).
73. See, e. g., Associated Industries of New York v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694, 707
(2d Cir. 1943).
74. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U. S.143 (1923);
ICC v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S.42 (1911) ; cf. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States,
249 U. S.557 (1919) ; Turner v. Williamson, 77 Ark. 586, 92 S.W. 867 (1906).
75. E. g., Natural Gas Act, Bituminous Coal Act, supra note 13a.
76. 264 U. S.258, 266-69 (1924).
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to the effect that permitting a petitioner to intervene implies a finding
by the Interstate Commerce Commission that he has a sufficient interest
77
to sue to set aside the order has been expressly repudiated in later cases.
Occasionally, however, the courts still seem to give weight to the fact that
a petitioner was a party before the agency. 78 Clearly, review should not
be granted for this reason alone. The statutory standards as to notice
and hearing are almost invariably different from those providing for judicial review.79 The purpose of an agency hearing is not only to give
private persons an opportunity to present their case but, more important,
to provide the agency with sufficient facts so as to be best able to make
decisions in the public interest. Agencies are commonly given broad discretion on the questions of notice and hearing, and most agencies have
proved to be very liberal in granting the right. The courts should refrain
from using participation as a test of standing to review an order lest it
result in agency policy of limiting participation in its hearings. The decision as to who has standing to review should, after all, be made by the
courts, not the agencies. 80
CONCLUSION

The question of "standing to review" is merely one phase of the bigger
problem of the proper place of the courts in the heterogeneous field of
administrative law. It involves a necessary adjustment between the effectuation of regulation thought necessary in the public interest and the protection of individual rights. The only conclusion reached from an investigation of the cases 81 is that decisions on this question are based on a
consideration of the practical effect of granting or withholding review in
a particular case rather than on such dialectics as whether or not there
has been an invasion of a "private legally protected interest." More specific. legislative provisions are not only impractical but unnecessary and
unwise. The very variety of functions performed by administrative agencies, and their impact on third persons, necessitates a retention by the
courts of considerable discretion in deciding who has standing to review
administrative actions.
C. C. H., III.
77. Alexander Sprunt & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 281 U. S.249, 255 (1930);

Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. United States, 281 U. S.479, 486 (1930) ; Interstate Electric Co. v. FPC. 164 F. 2d 485 (9th Cir. 1947); American Power & Light Co. v.
SEC, 143 F. 2d 250, 255 (1st Cir. 1944), reV'd on other grounds, 325 U. S.385 (1945).
78. See, e. g., FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U. S.239, 247-48 (1943) ;
Associated Industries of New York v.Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694, 708-12 (2d Cir. 1943) ;
Lawless v. SEC, 105 F. 2d 574, 577 (1st Cir. 1939). See also Davis, Res .udicata in
Administrative Law, 25 TEx. L. REv. 199 (1947).
79. Compare 49 STAT. 856 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 825g(a) (1946), with 49 STAT.
860 (1935), 16 U. S.C.§8251(a,b) (1946).
80. ". . . the interpretation of the Act with reference to court action is not
within the scope of administrative interpretation." Associated Industries of New York
v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694, 710, n. 48 (2d Cir. 1943). Some agencies have adopted the
practice of including in orders granting intervention a statement that it is not recognition that the intervenor is likely to be aggrieved by any order resulting from the hearings. E. g., Interstate Electric Co. v. FPC, 164 F. 2d 485 (9th Cir. 1947). Some
agencies have adopted regulations to this effect. See 14 CODE FED. REGS. § 285.4 (Supp.
1939) (CAA) ; 47 CoDE FED. REGS. § 1.102 (Supp. 1939) (FCC).
81. Davis recently concluded that "both the law and the verbiage of standing are
grossly in need of simplification." See Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce
Administrative Action, 49 COL. L. REv. 759 (1949).
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State-Federal Court Conflicts Over the Removability of Causes:
The Prospect Under the New Judicial Code
Under the dual court system of the United States, state and federal
courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over many types of cases.' The
danger of bringing such cases in the wrong court, which would exist
under a system of mutually exclusive jurisdiction, is eliminated by this
arrangement, but the plaintiff has first choice of the forum of litigation,
and can force the defendant to come into a state court in any such action.
To assure the defendant the opportunity to be heard in federal court,
Congress has provided, since the earliest days of the federal judiciary,'
for the removal of actions from the state courts to federal court. The
policy expressed by the removal statutes is that cases of concurrent jurisdiction will be tried in state courts only with the consent of both sides.
These statutes were the heterogeneous product of a century of ad
hoc legislation, designed to meet contemporary crises, and drafted with
little serious thought to the procedural difficulties they introduced.3 In
the aftermath of the Civil War, when sectional antagonisms reached a
bitter peak, the right of removal was extended very considerably, 4 but by
1887 the temper of the times had changed, and prompted by the swelling
volume of federal litigation, Congress sharply curbed the right of removal. 5 In the Judicial Code of 1911 these provisions were brought together with only minor changes, and the procedural variations incident to
the different types of removal cases were left untouched.6 The recent revision of Title 28 of the United States Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, includes the first attempt ever made at a thorough-going integration and clarification of the various removal statutes." A uniform procedure is directed for the removal of all cases. This Note will review
some difficulties which arose under the old removal procedure, and will
attempt to assess the impact of the changed procedure prescribed by the
new Code, and the desirability of further legislation.
THE STATUS Quo ANTE

Section 29 of the Judicial Code of 1911, often
eral removal procedure statute, prescribed the steps
removal in the more usual cases, those involving
based on diversity of citizenship." In these cases

referred to as the gennecessary to effectuate
a federal question or
the defendant was re-

1. 1 HUGHEs, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 291-360 (1931). The exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal district court is prescribed by 62 STAT. 869 ff., 28 U. S. C. §§ 1333-34,
1338(a), 1351, 1355-56 (Cong. Serv. 1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 101, 28 U. S. C.
§§ 1333 ff. (U. S. C. A. Aug. 1949 Pamph.).
2. Provision for removal was made in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 79
(1789).
3. See Doam, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 347-48 (1928).
4. The Judiciary Act of 1875 allowed removal by either party at any time before
trial, and provided that "the order of said circuit court dismissing or remanding said
."
18 STAT.
cause to the state court shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court .
472 (1875). This was the high-tide mark in removal liberality.
5. The Judiciary Act of 1887-88 restricted the right of removal to defendants,
shortened the allowable time, and provided that an order of "remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the
-circuit court so remanding such cause shall be allowed." 25 STAT. 434 (1888).
6. 36 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §§ 71-83 (1946).
7. 62 STAT. 869 ff., 28 U. S. C. §§ 1441-50 (Cong. Serv. 1948), as amended, 63
STAT. 101, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1441-50 (U. S. C. A. Aug. 1949 Pamph.).
8. "Whenever any party entitled to remove any suit . . . [mentioned in section
71 of this title] except suits removable on the ground of prejudice or local influence,
may desire to remove such suit from a State court to the district court of the United
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quired to present a removal petition to the state court, before the time
set by state law for his answer, accompanied by a bond conditioned upon
his prompt appearance in federal court. This procedure contrasted sharply
with that provided for the removal of actions brought against federal
officers and actions against non-residents who could show the existence
of prejudice or local influence in the state; 9 in these categories the removal petition was filed in the first instance in the federal district court.
The function of the state court was to decide whether the case was
removable as a matter of law, taking the allegations of the removal petition as true.10 If it decided this question in the affirmative, it was to
"proceed no further," and normally it would enter an order allowing
removal and staying its proceedings. The record was then sent to the
federal court, where the case was docketed, and continued as if it had
been instituted there originally, giving full effect to the prior pleadings
and orders of the state court."- But the federal court was the ultimate
arbiter of the question of removability. It was in no sense bound by the
decision of the state court.12 By a motion to remand the case to the state
court, the plaintiff could get an independent determination of the issue
by the federal court, and could controvert the allegations of the removal
petition.13 If he did so, a mixed question of fact and law was presented.
It follows that a case in which the state court properly allowed removal
might be remanded equally properly by the federal court after the facts
had been decided against the defendant.' 4
Since a remand order
was non-reviewable, 5 and was conclusive of the question of removability,16 the issue was laid to rest.
If the state court decided that the removal statute had not been complied with, it was not required to allow removal or to stay proceedings. L7
It could require the petitioner to answer and contest the action on the
merits, on penalty of a default judgment.' 8 But no action of the state
States, he may make and file a

petition, duly verified in such suit in such State
. . . and shall make and file therewith a bond. . . . It shall then be the
duty of the State court to accept said petition and bond and proceed no further in
court

such suit. . .

." 36 STAT. 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 72 (1946).
For a collection
of forms, see Lawis, REmOVAL OF CAusEs 549-611 (1923).
9. 36 STAT. 1094, 1097 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §§ 71, 76 (1946).
10. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. v. Dunn, 122 U. S. 513 (1887); Stone v. South
Carolina, 117 U. S.430, 432 (1886) ; Shunk v. Shunk Mfg. Co., 75 Ohio App. 253, 61
N. E. 2d 896 (1945). The record can be used to supply deficiencies in the petition.
Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S.118 (1882).
11. 36 STAT. 1098 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 79 (1946). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure govern removed cases. FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (c). See Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U. S.448, 454 (1943).
12. Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U. S.199 (1940) (state supreme court's decision
that the case was removable cannot be res adjudicatain federal court), reversing Armour & Co. v. Kloeb, 109 F. 2d 72 (6th Cir. 1939) ; Note, 50 YALE L. J.158 (1940).
13. The burden of proof rests on the petitioner. Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S.
421 (1887).
14. E. g., Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U. S. 199, 205 (1940).
15. See text at note 63 infra.
16. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Wade, 132 Ark. 551, 201 S.W. 787 (1918) ; Howell
v. Hartford Accident & I. Co., 160 S.C. 549, 159 S.E. 380 (1931), cert. dismissed,
284 U. S.691 (1931). Contra: Montgomery & A. M. Freight Lines v. Morris, 193
Miss. 211, 7 So. 2d 826, 8 So. 2d 502 (1942). In Peterson v. General Geophysical
Co., 185 P. 2d 56 (Cal. App. 1947), a remand was held to be res adjudicata on the
issue of removability of second identical action.
17. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Pechner, 95 U. S.183 (1878).
18. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563 (1941) ; Pearson
v. Zacher. 177 Minn. 182, 225 N. W. 9 (1929) ; Tierney v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Ins.
Co., 126 App. Div. 446, 110 N. Y. Supp. 613 (2d Dep't 1908) ; Note, 20 N. C. L. REv.
438, 444 (1942).
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court could deprive the petitioner of his right to an independent decision of
the question by the federal court. 19 Notwithstanding the state court's
refusal to stay proceedings, the defendant could file the record in federal
court, and force the plaintiff to appear there, at least for the purpose of
moving to remand the case to the state court, to avoid dismissal for want
of prosecution.20 A remand order would be conclusive, but if the federal
court denied the motion to remand, the case was tried there on the merits,
with the right of appellate review of all issues, including removability. 21
Until 1909, the defendant who wanted prompt federal consideration of
the action was forced to litigate on the merits in both courts simultaneously, leaving the outcome to appellate review in the event the two judgments were opposed. If both judgments were affirmed, only upon a final
determination of the removability of the cause by the Supreme Court would
it become known which court's proceedings were coram non judice and
void. Since normally the expense and inconvenience of such a procedure
were prohibitive, very few cases reached the Supreme Court this way.22
Although the plaintiff in the usual case wanted very much to remain
in the state court, he frequently lacked resources to litigate a double suit.
The defendant's insistence on removing the cause might force him to cease
affirmative proceedings in state court, in order to put all his energies into
the federal action. The choice of forum in such a case was inescapably
dependent upon the financial inequalities of the litigants.
An important step was taken toward simplification of removal disputes
in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. McCabe.23 In that case the defendant,
despite refusal by the state court to stay proceedings, filed the record in
federal court, where plaintiff's motion to remand was overruled, and the
case dismissed on the face of the pleadings. Plaintiff, without taking an
appeal, continued to press the suit in the state court, where the judgment
of the federal court, pleaded by defendant in bar of the action, was ignored
as a nullity. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the final judgment
of the federal court could not be attacked collaterally, even assuming that
the case was not removable. The federal court had "jurisdiction to decide
its jurisdiction" and its decision on the point was binding on the state
courts. The effect of this decision was to eliminate the possibility of a
double suit extending beyond the rendition of an affirmative federal finding
of removability. A defendant who successfully defeated a motion to remand in federal court could not be forced to continue in the state court.2 4
The state court was not obliged to stay proceedings, however, because
19. The state court has no discretion in the matter. Gordon v. Longest, 16 Pet.
97 (U. S. 1842) (which the Court's opinion states to be the first reported instance of
state court refusal to grant removal) ; Cook v. Nelson, 186 Misc. 1018, 62 N. Y. S. 2d
875 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
20. The chief danger of such a dismissal is that the statute of limitations continues to run. Bernays v. Leyland, 228 Fed. 913 (D. Mass. 1915).
21. The Supreme Court will take notice of non-removability on its own motion,
see Graves v. Corbin. 132 U. S. 571. 590 (1890) ; but not until after final judgment.
Bender v. Pennsylvania Co., 148 U. S. 502 (1893).
22. Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457 (1879) ; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485
(1880) ; cf. Finney v. American Bonding Co., 13 Idaho 534, 90 Pac. 859 (1907) ; see
Pruitt v. Charlotte Power Co., 165 N. C. 416, 420-21, 81 S. E. 624, 626 (1914).
23. 213 U. S. 207 (1909), reversing 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1009, 100 S. W. 219 (1907);
cf. Turner v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 106 U. S. 552 (1882) (result in principal
case foreshadowed). See, generally, Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdictionand Collateral
Attack, 40 CoL. L. REv. 1006 (1940).
24. Bolen-Darnell Coal Co. v. Kirk, 25 Okla. 273, 106 Pac. 813 (1909) ; see Holm
v. Hickory Cane Mining Co., 36 F. Supp. 441, 444 (W. D. Ky. 1941). Contra:
Golden v. Northern Pac. Ry., 39 Mont. 435, 104 Pac. 549 (1909); see Shohoney v.
Quincy, 0. & K. C. Ry., 223 Mo. 649, 666, 122 S. W. 1025, 1030 (1909).
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of the mere filing of the record and docketing of the case in the federal court,25 nor because of a dismissal for want of prosecution, 26 in the
absence of an express federal determination of removability.
Even after the McCabe case, the defendant whose removal petition
had been refused by the state court could not safely ignore further proceedings there, though he forced the plaintiff to litigate the cause in federal
court. Penal consequences faced him in the event the case was subsequently remanded. In such a case, any interim proceedings in the state
court were valid, 27 and the time within which pleadings were required to
be filed, and motions made, continued to run. The unfortunate defendant
was likely to find himself burdened with a default judgment in a court
nettled by his refusal to accept its decision on the removal question, and
unlikely to exercise its discretion to vacate the judgment. 2 8
Most frequently the petitioner excepted to the refusal of the state
court to allow removal, without filing the record in federal court. By contesting the action thereafter in the state court he did not waive his right
of removal, and he could be heard on the question of removability by the
Supreme Court, after review by the state tribunal of last resort. 2 9 Years
might elapse before the case reached the federal district court, where a
trial de novo would be required. A more inefficient system of justice can
hardly be imagined.
These procedural complexities developed from the rigidly conceptual
theory of jurisdiction established by the courts. At the moment of compliance by the petitioner with the provisions of the statute, the removal
takes place ipso facto and jurisdiction vests in the federal court.30 No
order by the state court is necessary for this purpose: its order "allowing" removal is in reality only its conclusion that removal has already
taken place, and its indication that it intends to stay proceedings.8 1 A
decision by the state appellate court that the case was improperly re32
moved will require the state court to take up where it has left off.
Remand by the federal court, for want of jurisdiction at the time of filing
the petition, establishes that the state court has never lost jurisdiction, and
has a completely retroactive effect.38 It has been held, accordingly, that
25. Southern Ry. v. Lloyd, 239 U. S. 496 (1916), afflrning 166 N. C. 24, 81 S. E.
1003 (1914).
26. Iowa Central Ry. v. Bacon, 236 U. S. 305 (1915).
27. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563, 566 (1941).
28. Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P. 2d 1053 (1939) (mere belief that
case was removed does not excuse failure to appear) ; Stevens v. Northway, 293
Mich. 31, 291 N. W. 211 (1940) (characterizing defendant's attempt at removal as
"somewhat defiant"), aff'd. sub nom. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, .supra
note 27.
29. Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, 223 (U. S. 1873).
30. Baltimore & Ohio R. R; v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 14-15 (1881). But if the
state court lacked jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the federal court cannot take the
case by removal, even though it would have original jurisdiction.

ment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 260 U. S. 261, 287-88 (1922).

General Invest-

By statute, how-

ever, it is provided that service may be had or perfected upon defendants after removal,
using federal process. 41 STAT. 554 (1920), 28 U. S. C. §83 (1946), re-enacted in
substance, 62 STAT. 869 ff., 28 U. S. C. § 1448 (Cong. Serv. 1948).
31. See State ex rel. Missouri & N. A. R. R. v. Johnston, 234 Mo. 338, 348, 137
S. W. 595, 597 (1911).
32. Most states allow appeals from such orders. E. g., Crisp v. Champion Fibre
Co., 193 N. C. 77, 136 S. E. 238 (1927). Contra: Rose v. Tennessee Eastman Corp.,
184 Tenn. 252, 198 S. W. 2d 549 (1947).
33. Yankaus v. Feltenstein, 244 U. S. 127 (1917); Germania Fire Ins. Co. v.
Francis, 52 Miss. 457 (1876) ; Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 79
Utah 33, 7 P. 2d 279 (1932). The jurisdiction is sometimes said to be suspended.
Seeligson's Ex'rs v. Texas Transportation Co., 70 Tex. 198, 7 S. W. 708 (1888).
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the remanded defendant is subject to a default judgment even where the
state court allowed removal.3 4 On the other hand, if the federal court
validly vacates its remand order, any proceedings had in the state court
in the interim are invalid, since the federal court has always had the indivisible jurisdiction.3 5
Partial protection was afforded the defendant by a federal injunction,
forbidding the plaintiff from proceeding in the state court. Removal case
injunctions constitute a well-established exception to the statutory prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings.3 6 Although a few decisions
are reported refusing to issue an injunction where the removability of the
case is doubtful, 3 7 recent cases show uniform willingness to prevent double
litigation and harm to the defendant, by a liberal use of the restraining
power.3" No cases have been found on the point, but it would seem that
violation of the restraining order is punishable as a criminal contempt
even where the federal court decides later that it lacked jurisdiction over
the cause. 9 It does not appear from the cases, however, that an injunction
stops the running of time against the defendant.40 This is especially disastrous in view of the probability that its psychological effect upon the
state court is not likely to be favorable to the remanded defendant, who
must rely heavily upon the exercise of judicial grace.
I

THE JUDICIAL CODE OF 1948

Disagreement between state courts and federal district courts over
removability has led to a substantial change in removal procedure under
the revised code. All cases are now to be removed in the same way. Section 1446 requires:
"(a)

A defendant desiring to remove . . . from a State court shall
file in the district court of the United States . . . a verified
petition containing a short and plain statement of the facts which

entitle him or them to removal...
34. Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P. 2d 1053 (1939) ; cf. Tracy Loan &
Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note 33 (order of removal does not extend
the time for contest of insurance policy containing "incontestable clause"). A more
enlightened, if less "logical" view was taken in Tomson v. Iowa State Tray. Men's
Ass'n, 78 Neb. 400, 110 N. W. 997 (1907) (default judgment a nullity because remand was based on issue of fact, case being prima facie removable) ; Bishop-Babcock
Sales Co. v. Lackman, 4 S.W. 2d 109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (reversing lower court's
ruling that it was too late for defendant to plead privilege of change of venue after
remand) ; cf. Seufert v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 182 La. 495, 162 So. 54 (1935)
(liquidators of national bank entitled to stay of proceedings until federal court rules
on jurisdictional question: prohibition granted) ; see Roberts v. Chicago, St. P., M. &
0. Ry., 48 Minn. 521, 528, 51 N. W. 478, 479 (1892), aff'd without opinion, 164 U. S.
703 (1896) (divided court). But cf. Minus v. Grote, 154 S.W. 2d 140 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941). mandamus to compel certification of question of law denied sub n0om.
Grote v. Price, 139 Tex. 472, 163 S.W. 2d 1059 (1942) (express disclaimer, however, of tacit approval of intermediate court holding).
35. Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co., 125 F. 2d 213 (9th Cir. 1942) ; cf. Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Smith, 71 F. 2d 511 (4th Cir. 1934).
36. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S.118, 133 (1941) (collecting
authorities).
37. See 4 HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2562.
38. E. g., Holm v. Hickory Cane Mining Co., 36 F. Supp. 441 (W. D. Ky. 1941);
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 7 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. N. Y. 1934).
39. Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S.258, 289-95
(1947).
40. An injunction is always directed against the parties, never against the court
itself. See Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S.239, 245
(1905).
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"(e) Promptly after the filing of such petition and bond the defendant .

.

. shall file a copy of the petition with the clerk of such

State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court
shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." 41
An initial ambiguity needs resolution. If the statute is construed to
mean that some affirmative action by the state court is necessary "which
shall effect removal," the therapeutic effect of first presenting the petition
to the federal court will largely be dissipated. Since even under the old
42
this
statute no order of the state court was
43 required to effect removal,
rejected.
firmly
be
should
construction
Evidently the statute does not compel a reconsideration of the orthodox doctrine of retroactive, indivisible jurisdiction. One may easily conclude from the language that only "such petition" as contains "facts which
entitle him or them to removal . . . shall effect the removal."

Removal,

as before, occurs only when a sufficient petition and bond are presented,
and not because of any federal order of removal. The way is open, therefore, for some state courts to insist on proceeding with a case on the
ground that the face of the petition shows no right of removal.
Instructive in this regard are removal cases grounded on the existence of prejudice and local influence, in which the petition was presented
to the federal court under the previous statutes. 44 In numerous such cases
prior to the turn of the century, state courts asserted the right to determine for themselves whether the proceedings should be stayed, sometimes
in the face of an express federal order of removal. 45 Pennsylvania Company v. Bender 46 established that the filing of the petition in federal court,
together with a copy in the state court, did not per se deprive the state
court of jurisdiction if the petition was insufficient to warrant removal.
In that case, indeed, the federal court had directed a journal entry that
the defendant was "entitled to remove cause," but the Supreme Court declared that this was not a formal order and lacked effect. The clear implication of the opinion is that a federal order of removal is binding
on the state courts.47 At least as late as 1903, nevertheless, the right of
the state court to proceed in the face of an express federal order of removal was considered an open question. 48 It would appear that the doctrine of the McCabe case now requires the state court to accept a federal
determination of removability. 49 In recent years prejudice and local influence has seldom been assigned as a ground for removal; the revised Code
eliminates it altogether.50
41. 62 STAT. 869 ff., 28 U. S. C. § 1446 (Cong. Serv. 1948), as amended, 63 STAT.
101, 28 U. S. C. § 1446 (U. S. C. A. Aug. 1949 Pamph.) (emphasis added).
42. See text at notes 30, 31, mspra.
43. Cf. Donlan v. F. H. McGraw Co.. 81 F. Supp. 599 (E. D. N. Y. 1948).
44. 36 STAT. 1094 (1911), as amended. 28 U. S. C. § 72 (1946).
Prior to 24
STAT. 552 (1887), the petition was presented to the state court. 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
45. E.g., Dahlonega Co. v. Hall Merchandise Co., 88 Ga. 339, 342, 14 S.E. 473,
474 (1891) (federal order of removal held "void on its face") ; Bierbower v. Miller,
30 Neb. 161, 46 N. W. 431 (1890) ; Tucker v. Inter-States Life Ass'n, 112 N. C. 796,
17 S.E. 532 (1893).
46. 148 U. S.255 (1893).
47. Cf. Sparkman v. Supreme Council, 57 S.C. 16, 35 S.E. 391 (1900) (state
court's jurisdiction ceases when order reaches state court).
48. See Southern Ry. v. Allison, 190 U. S.326, 331 (1903) (stating the question
and expressly by-passing it).
49. See notes 23, 24 supra, and text.
50. Reviser's notes, H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A133 (1947). This
ground for removal has been interpreted restrictively. In re Pennsylvania Co., 137
U. S.451 (1890) (petitioner must convince federal court by affirmative proof of
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The removal petition was also presented to the federal court in actions brought against federal officers.5 1 Aside from a few early decisions, 52 these cases, although plentiful, show little state-federal conflict.
The procedural directions of the statute were very detailed: they commanded the issuance of a writ of certiorari to the state court to send "the
record and the proceedings in the cause," and provided that "thereupon it
shall be the duty of the State court to stay all further proceedings in the
cause, and the suit or prosecution, upon delivery of such process .
shall be held to be removed to the district court. . . ., 53 It is also noteworthy that very many of these cases involved criminal prosecutions which
had to stop when custody of the prisoner was assumed by the federal marshal under the writ of habeas corpus cum causa authorized by the statute. 54
These two types of removal cases make it clear that mandatory and
explicit language is required to eliminate conflicting interpretations. The
revised statute is deficient in this respect. That the draftsmen themselves
were not completely sanguine of success is evidenced by the marshalling
of devices to bring the record into federal court. An order to the petitioner to supply it, a writ of certiorari to the state court, or mere affidavits
may be employed in the court's discretion. 5 The variety of alternatives
serves to underline the delicacy of the relations between the court systems
and emphasizes the need for intelligent cooperation between individual
judges.
Only one state case has been reported so far in this field since the
effective date of the new Code. 56 There a trial court attempted to proceed in a case where non-resident defendants, after the dismissal of the
action against resident defendants, tried to remove by filing the proper
papers in the federal district court. The Supreme Court of Indiana issued
a writ of prohibition against further proceedings in the trial court, on the
ground that procedural compliance with the requirements of the federal
statute deprived state courts of authority to move until a remand of the
case by the federal court. No issue was raised as to the prima facie removability of the action. At most, therefore, the case can be considered
to imply a readiness to subordinate state court action when no gross
irregularities appear in the removal procedure. It does, however, augur
a favorable future for the new statute. At the same time, the position
of the trial court demonstrates that the problem is alive and real.
If the new procedure does not eliminate removal conflicts, it should
nevertheless serve to reduce them substantially. Formerly the state court
existence of prejudice) ; Cochran v. Montgomery Co., 199 U. S. 260 (1905) (overruling a long line of lower court decisions by denying removal to non-resident defendant joined with resident), reversing 128 Fed. 1019 (5th Cir. 1904). It was sometimes dangerous for counsel to attempt removal on this ground. In re Breckenridge,
31 Neb. 489, 48 N. W. 142 (1891) (disbarment proceeding against attorney who
swore to prejudice in all state courts) ; In re Sherwood, 259 Pa. 254, 103 Ati. 42
(1918).
51. 36 STAT. 1097 (1911). as amended, 39 STAT. 532 (1916), 28 U. S. C. § 76
(1946). The revised Code extends the right of removal to all federal officers. 62
STAT. 869 ff., 28 U. S. C. § 1442 (Cong. Serv. 1948).
52. Commonwealth v. Casey, 12 Allen 214 (Mass. 1866); McKee v. Coffin, 66
Tex. 304. 1 S. W. 276 (1886). ComPare State v. Sullivan, 110 N. C. 513, 14 S. E.
796 (1892) with State v. Sullivan, 50 Fed. 593 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1892) (same
case).
53. Cf. State ex rel. Hodson v. Circuit Judge, 33 Wis. 127, 131 (1873).
54. Since acquittal in federal court would render such removals non-reviewable,
the Supreme Court will entertain mandamus applications to compel remand. Maryland
v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9 (1926).
55. 62 STAT. 869 ff., 28 U. S. C. §§ 1447(b), 1449 (Cong. Serv. 1948).
56. State ex rel. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Boone Circuit Ct., 86 N. E. 2d 74
(Ind. 1949).
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had to take a stand before it could know the federal court's position. Considerations of comity, as well as the legal propositions of the state court's
opinion, might tend to sway the federal court toward remand in a doubtful
case, 57 but the federal judiciary's duty was to act independently in this
determination of its own jurisdiction. Under the present procedure, few
state courts, if assured of a quick federal consideration of the question,
will be unwilling to call a halt,5 8 and once the federal court has granted
removal affirmatively, opposition must cease.
It is therefore unfortunate that the statute fails to provide for immediate federal consideration of the petition. The only clue to what the
draftsmen thought they were providing is found in the reviser's statement that "the cumbersome procedure of remand" has been eliminated
because "the right of removal [will be] determined in that court before
the petition is granted." 19 It is to be hoped that the courts will heed
this suggestion to give the petition prompt and careful consideration, but
it would be unwise to postpone the question until the parties were ready
for a full-scale contest of the issues of fact. Perhaps it is more advisable
to provide in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a concise preliminary hearing on the sufficiency of the petition and bond, restricting
the issue on the pattern of the former state court proceeding. 0 Under the
doctrine of the McCabe case, a federal order granting removal after such
a hearing ought to halt state court proceedings effectively. Subsequently,
on formal motion to remand, issues of fact could be presented to the
federal court.
Section 37 of the 1911 Code was interpreted as requiring the remand of a case properly removed, when subsequent events eliminated
the ground for original federal jurisdiction."' In this situation the remand
had no retroactive effect, because the state court had lacked jurisdiction
while the case-was before the federal court. It follows that upon a remand of this kind, time should not run in the state court against the defendant and full effect ought to be given to the proceedings had in federal court.6 2 The revised Code apparently eliminates this basis of remand,
since it requires a remand only where "it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction." 63 The Reviser's Notes
57. Springer v. Howes, 69 Fed. 849 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1895) ; see Newberry v.
Meadows Fertilizer Co., 1 F. Supp. 665, 666 (E.D. N. C. 1932).
58. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U. S.207, 219 (1909); Seufert
v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 182 La. 495, 499, 162 So. 54, 56 (1935).
59. Reviser's Notes, H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 137 (1947).
60. See text at note 10 supra.
61. "If in any suit . . . removed from a State court to a district court of the

United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said district court, at any time
after such suit has been . . . removed thereto, that such suit does not really and
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said
district court ...the said district court shall proceed no further therein but shall ...
remand it to the court from which it was removed. . . ." 36 STAT. 1098 (1911), 28
U. S. C. § 80 (1946).

Remand is improper when plaintiff's voluntary action fur-

nishes its ground. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.. 303 U. S.283
(1938). But cf. Texas Transportation Co. v. Seeligson, 122 U. S.519 (1887) (remand affirmed where plaintiff dismissed as to only non-resident defendant).
62. The state court has discretion whether to give effect to federal court proceedings in cases remanded for improper removal. Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187
(1884).

63. "(c) If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case.
A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk of the
State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case." 62 STAT. 869 ff.,

28 U. S. C. § 1447(c) (Cong. Serv. 1948).
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and other legislative history are lamentably silent. 64 Prior to the enactment
of any positive provision by Congress, it was settled that federal jurisdiction could not be divested by subsequent events. 65 In the interests of
rapid settlement of controversies, without patent unfairness, it would be
desirable to regard the revised Code as restoring this rule. If the case
has been brought there properly, the litigants should be compelled to remain in federal court.
An alarming feature of the revised procedure, as originally enacted
in 1948, was the total omission of the rule that a remand order by a
federal district court is non-reviewable. Originally enacted in 1887,66 to
reduce the number of cases brought for appellate review, the rule had
been buttressed by a formidable line of decisions. Remand may not be
reviewed by appeal or certiorari directly,6 7 nor upon a certificate of division of opinion between the lower court judges,6 nor upon application

for a writ of mandamus,6 9 nor when the case has come from the state court
of last resort.70
That the firm policy has given a little ground rather
recently may be indicated by decisions of the Supreme Court that the
statute does not apply to review of remands ordered by Courts of Ap-

peals. 7 1 Nevertheless the already overwhelming pressure on appellate review made it extremely unlikely that Congress intended to unleash a new
flood of cases into that area. There was no mention of this important
deletion in the considerable legislative history. Apparently the omission

was due to inadvertence, since the amendments of 1949 explicitly restore
the rule.

During the interim, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit achieved
the same result, denying review of a remand order on the ground that
72
an appeal would not lie because remand did not constitute a "final" order.

The early precedents on which the decision was based, however, clearly
64. Reviser's Notes § 1359, H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A125
(1947), states that "provisions of section 80 of title 28, U. S. C., 1940 ed., for dismissal of an action not really and substantially involving a dispute or controversy
within the jurisdiction of a district court, were omitted as unnecessary. Any court
will dismiss a case not within its jurisdiction when its attention is dravm to the fact,
or even on its own motion." This does not mention remand, and the language seems
to indicate that the situation contemplated by the reviser is the one in which the jurisdictional allegations are not proved to the court's satisfaction.
65. Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198, 208 (U. S. 1853); Schlesinger and Strasburger, Divestment of Federal Jurisdiction: A Trapdoor Section in the Judicial Code,
39 COL. L. REv. 595, 598-601 (1939). But compare Southern Pac. Co. v. Haight, 126
F. 2d 900 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 676 (1942), with Highway Const.
Co. v. McClelland, 15 F. 2d 187 (8th Cir. 1926) ; Schindler v. Wabash R. R., 84 F.
Supp. 319 (W. D. Mo. 1949) ; Galbraith v. Bond Stores, 4 F. R. D. 319 (W. D. Mo.
1945) (dismissal is improper as an alternative to remand when jurisdiction is divested).
66. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, 583 (1896).
67. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Roberts, 141 U. S. 690 (1891) ; Thompson
v. Kelly, 170 F. 2d 213 (8th Cir. 1948) (district court ordered remand on its own
initiative).
68. Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U. S. 56 (1887).
69. Ex parte Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 451 (1890).
70. McLaughlin Bros. v. Hallowell, 228 U. S. 278 (1913).
71. Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. Flowers, 330 U. S. 464, 467 (1947) ; Gay v. Ruff,
292 U. S. 25. 31 (1934) (the certiorari vower of Court of Aopeals enable review;
German Nat. Bank v. Speckert, 181 U. S. 405, 409 (1901), distinguished).
72. Shotkin v. Perkins, 172 F. 2d 377 (10th Cir. 1949). The rationale of the
early cases on which the decision rests is difficult to reconcile with Justice Jackson's
definition of an appealable order as a "final disposition of a claimed right which is not
an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it." Cohen
v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
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indicate that the pre-1887 rules allowed mandamus to compel lower federal courts to take jurisdiction, 73 and imply also that appeals on the issue
of removability were always possible after state court action had been
exhausted. 74 There can be no question, therefore, that a thorny question was about to be reopened, and that the statutory amendment of 1949
was badly needed.
A problem of interpretation may arise under the new section. The
old statute prohibited "appeal or writ of error from the decision of the
district court so remanding." 75 Under the present one, "an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." 76 Does the difference in language remove the Supreme Court's power to review remands ordered by the Courts
of Appeals? The words, "or otherwise," seem broad enough to cover
any type of review, and no mention is made of the "district court."
Hitherto the Supreme Court has asserted the power to review remands
ordered by the Courts of Appeals on the ground that its certiorari power
over such courts is very broad, and that there was no explicit statutory
hindrance. 77 It would be destructive of flexibility to interpret the present
language as altering this proposition. The rule of non-reviewability is designed only to reduce the amount of federal appellate litigation. Certiorari from the Courts of Appeals in a case involving important substantive issues ought to be in the discretion of the Court. Presumably
an application for a writ of certiorari would be denied in cases which
did not present such issues, regardless of the correctness of the lower
court's decision on the immediate facts of the case. In this way, the
Court would be immunized from the necessity of mulling over the vast
majority of remanded cases, and would retain the power to review those
cases it considers important, from among the limited number which are
remanded by Courts of Appeals.
THE FURTHER NEEDS
How well does the revised procedure meet the legitimate needs of the
removing defendant? He can get a quick determination of removability
by applying for a federal injunction, and if the removal petition is acted
on favorably, presumably the injunction will be granted, bringing affirmative proceedings in the state court to a stop.78 To obviate the possibility of sharp practice by plaintiffs before the petition can be considered
by the federal court, however, it might be advisable to provide for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order as a matter of course upon the
filing of a removal petition and bond. Combined with a rule requiring
prompt preliminary hearing on the prima facie sufficiency of the petition, 79
such an order would not prejudice the plaintiff; no state court would dismiss his suit for want of prosecution under such compulsion, and very
few remanded cases would delay him excessively. If the face of the petition were sufficient, and a subsequent remand were based on a difficult
APPRAISAL:

73. Ex parte Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 451, 453 (1890) ; Chicago & Alton R. R.
v. Wiswall, 90 U. S. 507, 508 (1874).
74. See Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Roberts, 141 U. S. 690, 694 (1891);
Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U. S. 56, 58 (1887).
75. 25 STAT. 434 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 71 (1946) (now repealed).
76. 63 STAT. 102, 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) (U. S. C. A. Aug. 1949 Pamph.).
77. See note 71 supra and text.
78. See text at note 38 supra.
79. See text at note 58 supra.
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issue of fact, delay would be justifiable. No interlocutory appeal should
be allowed from such a perfunctory injunction, 80 since the question of removability, which lies at the core of the matter, is to be passed on quickly
by the district court, could not itself be made the basis for appeal before
final judgment, 8 ' and will determine the right of the state court to proEeed. A remand or refusal of the petition would of course operate to dissolve the injunction.8 2
The most serious defect of the revised statute is its failure to attack
the old doctrine that remand means the state court's jurisdiction has never
been divested. Time ought not to run against the petitioner while he is
before the federal court; remand ought not to have a retroactive effect.
The filing of the removal petition and subsequent proceedings thereon
should be given the same effect by a state court as a plea to the jurisdiction made and overruled there, so that after remand the defendant can
plead in abatement or answer to the merits. 83 It is especially undesirable to apply the doctrine when remand is based on an issue of fact, the
face of the petition being sufficient.8 4 It would seem that the defendant
could stop the running of time against him for most purposes, under present procedure, by filing the removal petition, answering in the state court,
and immediately enjoining the plaintiff from proceeding further.8 5 Such
a combination of steps ought to halt the action in the state court and prevent a default judgment in the event of subsequent remand.
Consideration should also be given to the advisability of a direct
statutory prohibition. Constitutional objections to this limitation upon
state court procedure do not seem insuperable. Removability is a federal
question, and Congress has the power to safeguard the exercise of federal
rights. Inasmuch as defendants may be discouraged from seeking removal
of doubtful cases by the fear of a penalty in the state court after remand, 86
federal rights are prejudiced. On this basis a statute which prohibits the
running of time in state8 7courts while removals are pending before federal
courts may be justified.
These difficulties would arise infrequently if remand were made less
common. The present majority rule that doubtfully removable cases will
80. At present an interlocutory appeal may be taken. Peters v. Standard Oil Co.,
174 F. 2d 162 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F. 2d 87 (8th Cir. 1947);
Morgan v. Kroger Grocery & B. Co., "96 F. 2d 470 (8th Cir. 1938).
81. See note 21 supra and text.
82. See Yankaus v. Feltenstein, 244 U. S. 127, 131 (1917).
83. Most rules of court allow an extension of time, often discretionary in length,
after a preliminary objection or motion has been overruled. E. g., PFNA. R. Civ.
P. 1028(d), PNNA. STAT. AN., tit. 12, App. (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
84. Accord, Tomson v. Iowa State Tray. Men's Ass'n, 78 Neb. 400, 110 N. W.
997 (1907) ; see Parker's Adm'r v. Clarkson, 39 W. Va. 184, 196, 19 S. E. 431, 436
(1894).
85. See Morbeck v. Bradford-Kennedy Co., 19 Idaho 83, 91-92, 113 Pac. 89, 91
(1910) (filing of removal petition does not prevent defendant from pleading or answering in state court).
86. See Mills v. American Bonding Co., 13 Idaho 556, 558, 91 Pac. 381, 382
(1907) (defendant must assume consequences of wasting his day in court).
87. E. g., § 1447(c) might be amended to read, "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the
district court shall remand the case. . . . After remand, the defendant shall have
such time to plead in the State court as the laws of the State may direct, but not less
than days after the receipt by the clerk of the State coirt of a certified copy of
the order of remand." See note 63 supra for full text of present § 1447(c).
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be rermanded deserves reconsideration. s8 While the general rule is that
federal jurisdiction must be made to appear affirmatively and is to be construed strictly, the conclusiveness of remand gives reason for an exception
here. Otherwise the defendant may be penalized for seeking removal in
a close case, a pernicious result in a matter of federal right. It would also
seem proper to allow liberal amendments to the petition to be made in
federal court.8 9 If there is a real case for removal nothing is gained by
punishing the defendant for the inadvertence of counsel. The state of
the law on the matter is chaotic,90 although it is clear that amendments as
to matters of form are freely allowed. 91
If the traditional rule that federal appellate review will always raise
the question of jurisdiction be conceded, it ought nevertheless to be
limited to matters strictly jurisdictional. Unless the plaintiff moves for
remand in the district court he should be held to have waived consideration
92
on appeal of anything but the record at the time of filing the petition.
Defects should be quite liberally construed as procedural and hence waivable. 93

Indeed it might be salutary to rule that a judgment on the merits

may not be reversed on appeal for failure to rule correctly on a procedural error in removing the case, even though the plaintiff properly
preserves his exception. 9 Under the present Code, matters of abatement,
not jurisdictional, are treated in this way.95
Making the denial of a motion to remand non-reviewable seems undesirable, although such a rule would eliminate the doleful possibility of a
remand ordered on appellate review after a long contest of the merits.9 6
The prevailing concept of federal appellate jurisdiction would need to be
changed drastically; otherwise there is the question whether a federal
appellate court can decide an appeal on the merits without considering constitutional objections to its jurisdiction.9 7 More immediately, such a rule
88. Breymann v. Pennsylvania, 0. & D. R. R., 38 F. 2d 209, 212 (6th Cir. 1930);
American Fabrics Co. v. Couturier, 65 F. Supp. 563, 565 (N. D. Ala. 1946) ; Richard
v. National City Bank, 6 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1934). Contra: In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 50 F. 2d 430, 435 (D. Minn. 1931) ; Bon v. Midwest Refining Co., 30 F. 2d 410 (D. Wyo. 1929), aff'd, 43 F. 2d 23 (10th Cir. 1930).
89. Accord, Hall v. Payne, 274 Fed. 237 (D. Mont. 1921).
90. Compare Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 169 U. S. 92, 101 (1898), wvith
Kinney v. Columbia Savings & Loan Ass'n, 191 U. S. 78 (1903) ; Kansas City So.
Ry. v. Prunty, 133 Fed. 13 (5th Cir. 1904), cert. denied, 197 U. S. 623 (1905).
91. See Miller v. Soule, 221 Fed. 493, 498 (E. D. Pa. 1915) ; cf. Kramer v. Jarvis,
81 F. Supp. 360 (D. Neb. 1948); Gallahar v. Geo. A. Rheman Co., 50 F. Supp. 655
(S. D. Ga. 1943).
92. Cf. Hartog v. Memory, 116 U. S. 588 (1886) (parties cannot call on court
to go behind averments of record except by appropriate plea); Hill v. Walker, 167
Fed. 241 (8th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 214 U. S. 517 (1909). But cf. Page v. Wright,
116 F. 2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940).
93. See Mackay v. Uinta Development Co., 229 U. S. 173, 176 (1913) (dictum
advocating very broad concept of waiver in removal).
94. Present practice preserves review of procedural defects. E. g., Martin v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 151 U. S. 673, 687 (1894) (reviewing failure to file petition
on time and holding it waived because not raised below).
95. "There shall be no reversal in the Supreme Court or a court of appeals for
error in ruling upon matters in abatement which do not involve jurisdiction." 62
STAT. 869 ff., 28 U. S. C. § 1205 (Cong. Serv. 1948).
96. E. g., Parker's Adm'r v. Clarkson, 39 W. Va. 184, 19 S. E. 431 (1894) (suit
begun in state court in 1865, removed in 1871, remanded by Supreme Court in 1890,
tried de novo in 1894).
97. The non-reviewability of remand orders raises no constitutional difficulty,
since Congress need not exercise the constitutional grant of federal jurisdiction, and
can prescribe federal appellate jurisdiction. U. S. CoxsTr. ART. III, § 2.
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would quickly breed conflicts of decision among the federal district courts,
which could not easily be eliminated. This difficulty does not arise under
the rule that remands are non-reviewable, because the same question of
law may be reviewed in another case where remand is denied.
The very existence of state-federal conflicts on removability emphasizes the need for a sharper definition of removal rights. The old doctrine
of the "separable controversy," Is for which the revised statute substitutes
the difficult concept of the "separate and independent cause of action," 99
is the foremost example of a highly contested ground of removal. When
it is remembered that most removal rights depend on the possibility of
original federal jurisdiction, the problem is seen in its larger setting. 100
The truth may be that the chaotic state of removal questions reflects a
widespread and long-standing discontent over the distribution of judicial
power between the state and federal courts. Unquestionably some of the
harshness of the rules of removal is due to the tepid esteem in which federal diversity jurisdiction is held by both sides of the judiciary. 1° 1 But
the digging of legalistic pitfalls is not the proper way to respond to the
matter. Such tactics merely penalize the unwary, and allow seasoned
hands full diversity benefits. Besides, the same rules work against removals grounded on the existence of a federal question. If the case involves a substantial federal question, it deserves a federal hearing.
As for pure diversity cases, the development of the rule laid down in
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins'o 2 has progressed far enough so that there are
few situations in which the federal courts do not follow the state law on
substantive points.' 03 In view of the liberal quality of the Federal Rules
it is not likely that unfairness to the plaintiff will result from keeping him
in the federal court.'0 4 If his desire to stay in the state court stems from
particular qualities of the local cou.nty-seat atmosphere, he deserves no
sympathy. Diversity jurisdiction must be attacked directly, if at all. Since
most removals occur in diversity cases, 05 another substantial argument is
furnished to the well-filled dossier for the case in favor of abolishing
diversity jurisdiction altogether. 0 6
S.L.P.
98. 36 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 71 (1946), third sentence.
99. 62 STAT. 869 ff., 28 U. S. C. § 1441(c) (Cong. Serv. 1948); see Wills and
Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdictionand Procedure,9 OHIO ST.
L. J. 257, 258-68 (1948).
100. See Chadbourn and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U.
OF PA. L. Rlv. 639 (1942).
101. Cf. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judical Power Between United States and
State Courts, 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 520-26 (1928).
102. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
103. See Gorrell and Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 OHIO

STATE

L. J.

276, 279-90 (1948).
104. Aside from possible prejudice in the state court, reasons for wanting removal
in diversity cases are evident when the federal devices of deposition and discovery,
pre-trial conference, interpleader, intervention and third-party practice are compared
with their counterparts under some of the more antiquated state rules.
105. In the fiscal year 1946, of 2531 private cases removed from state courts, 2352
were based on diversity of citizenship; the comparable figures for 1947 were 2814
removed, 2722 diversity cases. Of these 2722 diversity cases, 647 were on policies of
insurance, 772 were motor vehicle presonal injury actions, and 685 were other personal
injury negligence actions. REP. DIR. ADMIN. OFFICE U. S. COURTS 1947, Table C2,
109 (1948).
106. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 23440 (1948).
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Discrimination as a Common Carrier's Defense in Shippers' Actions
The Interstate Commerce Act' was passed against a background of
unrestrained abuses in the nature of preferences to one customer over
another, rebates to individual shippers, and free passes to almost anyone
even remotely connected with a railroad.2 In very broad language, the
Act prohibits rebates and allied devices, preferences in rates and services,
and general discrimination. This Note is not intended to examine what
constitutes a violation of these prohibitions; its purpose is to examine some
problems which arise in a suit against the carrier on a contract which
violates the Act.
Obviously, a carrier bent on discrimination can prefer a shipper by
settling unenforceable claims. The litigation arises generally when a carrier chooses to disavow agreements which would prefer a shipper. For
an understanding of the defenses available to a carrier in such a shipper's
action, a brief resum6 of the applicable provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act will be helpful.
It is a maxim in the law of common carriers that the carrier must
treat all its customers alike 8 It may not grant favors to special groups,
and its prices must be the same to all for the same service.4 These rules
are solidified in Sections 2, 3, and 6 of the Act. Section 2 prohibits "unjust discrimination," defined as charging one person a greater or less
compensation for a service rendered than that charged to others, "by a
special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device." Section 3 prohibits
"undue preferences and prejudices," and requires payment of freight
charges as a prerequisite to delivery. Finally, Section 6 requires that all
rates, fares, and charges be filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and forbids transportation without compliance with this requirement.
No rebates from the filed rates are allowed, nor privileges and facilities except as are specified in the published tariffs. These sections of the Act
serve as the basis for carrier defenses in several types of actions by aggrieved shippers. Occasionally, they boomerang against the carrier who
neglects to observe them scrupulously.
DEFENSE OF ILLEGALITY OF THE CONTRACT

In effect, the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act add up to
this: a carrier may not legally render any service not provided for in the
tariffs on file. The consequences of this rule as applied to cases involving
contracts violative of the Interstate Commerce Act have been varied and
paradoxical. The bald rule of law is that the Interstate Commerce Act
is designed to eliminate all preferences, rebates, discriminations, and simi1. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. § 1 et seq. (1946).
2. For a revelation of these abuses prior to the Interstate Commerce Act, see the
testimony given by railroad executives, shippers, and others in hearings before the
Senate Select Committee on Interstate Commerce, SEN. RE'. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st
Sess., Part 2 (1886), especially the following pages: 66-67, 187, 196-198, 252-253, 260261, 530-532, 777-778, 1210-1211, 1218, 1221, 1261, 1303; Part 1, app. 215-216. The
effectiveness of the discrimination device in building up a monopoly is demonstrated
by an account of the rise of the Standard Oil monopoly in LAmuABEE, THE RAILROAD
QUESTION 114-123 (1893).

3. As used in this note, "carrier" includes all common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.

4. What constitutes equal treatment, equal charge, and what circumstances may

authorize a departure from these rules, is a whole body of law in itself. For a study
of the development of the law of discrimination at common law, see Kline, The Origin
of the Rule Against Unjust Discrimination, 66 U. OF PA. L. REv. 123 (1918) ; Kline,
The Scope of the Ride Against Unjust Discrimination by Public Servants, 67 U. OF

PA. L. REv. 109 (1919).

94

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

lar abuses, so as to assure all shippers and passengers equal treatment. 5
Yet conceding that a given contract violates the Interstate Commerce Act,6
there remain several questions: Is the contract void, or merely voidable at
the option of the injured party? Who is the injured party in a case of
discrimination, i. e., who may claim the benefit of the Act? What kind
of relief, if any, may be obtained for its breach? May a tort action be
maintained, although the contract, which gave rise to the transaction during
which the tort was committed, is illegal?
Specific Relief.-As would be expected, specific performance cannot
be had on an illegal contract. A carrier cannot be made to perform a
contract which required him to violate the Act.7 Just so, a suit by a
shipper to recover a bald rebate due him under a contract with the carrier will not be successful.' It follows that an action to replevy or otherwise recover in kind goods in the hands of the carrier without paying
the storage charges on them, will likewise fail, where there is an illegal
contract that the carrier shall pay the storage.9 These results follow along
well established lines of contract law, and are in keeping with the policy
of the Act.
Suit for Damages for Breach of Contract.-By far the most common
situation is the one in which the shipper enters into a contract with the
carrier, which the carrier breaches, setting up as a defense that the contract is illegal under the Interstate Commerce Act, and that therefore no
action can be maintained on it. An example will serve to clarify the
point. In Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Kirby 10 a shipper wished to get his
horses to New York in time for a horse show. He was assured by the
carrier that if he shipped over its line, his horses would reach a junction
point in time to be connected to a "Horse Special," a fast freight that
would arrive in New York in plenty of time. There was no provision in
the tariffs for this service, and the shipper was charged the regular rate
for the shipment. The carload did not reach the junction point in time,
the shipment was consequently delayed, and the shipper sued for damages.
As a defense to the action, the carrier asserted that the guarantee of the
connection was illegal as a preference to this shipper, and further that
no such service was provided for in the filed tariffs. The defense was
upheld in the Supreme Cofirt, on the ground that to sanction this special
contract would be to defeat the broad purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act to compel uniform services at uniform rates. Even a guarantee
that the passenger will arrive at his destination at the scheduled time
is an illegal contract under the discrimination prohibitions of Section 3,
5. E. g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. U. S., 289 U. S. 627 (1933) ; see New York, N. H.
&'H. R. R. v. ICC, 200 U. S. 361. 391 (1906) ; Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 235 Fed.
731, 736 (N. D. Cal. 1916) ; Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Swanson, 102 Ga. 754, 762, 28 S.
E. 601, 604 (1897).
6. As used in this note, "illegal" means in violation of the Interstate Commerce
Act.
7. Whitaker Glessner Co. v. Wheeling Terminal Ry., 99 W. Va. 38, 127 S. E.
639 (1925).
8. Ohio Tank Car Co. v. Keith Ry. Equipment Co., 148 F. 2d 4 (7th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U. S. 730 (1945) ; Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 235 Fed. 731 (N. D.
Cal. 1916); Foster Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 270 Mo. App. 629, 194
S. W. 281 (1917) ; Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Swanson, 102 Ga. 754, 28 S. E. 601 (1897).
9. Hanaman v. Liberty Trucking Co., 242 Wis. 92, 7 N. W. 2d 609 (1943).
10. 225 U. S. 155 (1912), reversing 242 Ill. 418, 90 N. E. 252 (1909). See also
Consumer's Mutual Oil Co. v. Schaff, 59 F. 2d 730 (1st Cir. 1932).

1949]

NOTES

or the tariff regulations of Section 6.11 Thus one who takes a certain
train on the assurance that he will arrive at his destination in time to
perform at a concert may not collect damages if the train is late and
causes him to miss his engagement.1 2 An agreement to hold a train
over to allow a particular shipper's car to be connected to it will meet
the same fate.13
Few cases have been found where the shipper sues on the legal part
of the contract, maintaining that the void provision is separable and does
not vitiate the entire contract, but where such an action has been brought,
the result has been rather anomalous. In Siebert v, Erie R. R., 14 the
bill of lading involved had a special notation on it to put the car off at
a private siding. Under the provisions of the Uniform Bill of Lading, 15
freight on such a siding was to be at the shipper's risk. After holding
that the notation was illegal under Section 6, the court said that the
shipper could recover for freight stolen from the car while on the siding.
The theory was that since the car should never have been put on the
siding, the risk was still on the carrier, just as if the car were still on
the carrier's lines. This decision, it will be noted, left untouched the
contract of affreightment, and treated the bill of lading as if the illegal
provision did not exist. Thus the shipper, asserting the illegality of a
provision put in the bill of lading almost certainly at his own request, was
able to receive the benefit of a contract he failed to make.
Suit for Damages in Tort.-Aggrieved shippers have sometimes
brought tort actions, charging that the carrier is liable for negligent acts.
The decisions seem to be hopelessly in conflict and irreconcilable on this
point. Where recovery is allowed, it is generally on the theory that the
illegal provision in the contract does ,not extinguish the carrier's common
law liability for negligence.' 8 On the other hand, it has been held that
to allow recovery in tort would circumvent the rule against recovery on
the contract, and allow the shipper the benefit of his illegal contract"
Although the cases are too few for definitive analysis, there is a slight
indication that they may divide on the point of whether the opportunity
for liability would have arisen even if the carrier had never performed
the prohibited act. For example, where the carrier called at the shipper's
office for money to be shipped, in violation of the tariff, and the money
11. Alabama Great So. Ry. v. Conner, 227 Ala. 562, 151 So. 355 (1933), cert.
denied, 291 U. S. 675 (1933). The earlier tendency seems to have been to consider
this guarantee as only what was due the passenger, and to allow recovery. Foster v.
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 56 Fed. 434 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1893).
12. Gerardy v. Louisville & N. R. R., 52 Misc. 466. 102 N. Y. Supp. 548 (Sup.
Ct. 1907). An interesting view was expressed in Hayes v. Wabash R. R., 163 Mich.
174, 128 N. W. 217 (1910), where it was held that the ticket seller, as defendant's
agent, may be presumed by the public to have authority to make such a guarantee, and
that plaintiff could recover damages for missing a connection. No defense under the
Interstate Commerce Act was raised.
13. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Jones, 6 Ala. App. 617, 60 So. 945 (1912).
14. 189 App. Div. 586, 179 N. Y. Supp. 136 (1st Dep't 1919), affd, 232 N. Y.
517, 134 N. E. 553 (1921).
15. Id. at 591, 592, 179 N. Y. Supp. at 139.
16. Adams Express Co. v. Darden,.286 Fed. 61 (6th Cir. 1923), aff'd and cert.
denied. 265 U. S. 265 (1924) ; Pond-Decker Lumber Co. v. Spencer, 86 Fed. 846 (5th
Cir. 1898) ; Gallop & Fisher v. Norfolk So. R. R., 173 N. C. 21, 91 S. E. 375 (1917),
writ of error dismissed, 248 U. S. 596 (1919) ; Kessenger v. Fitzgerald, 152 N. C. 247,
67 S. E. 588 (1910) ; cf. Merchant's Cotton Press Co. v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 151 U. S. 368 (1894) ; Judge v. Northern Pac. Ry., 189 Fed. 1014 (C. C. D. Ore.
1911).
17. American Ry. Exp. Co. v. American Trust Co., 47 F. 2d 16 (7th Cir. 1931),
29 MIcH. L. Rv. 363 (1931) ; Payne v. Bassett, 235 S. W. 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921),
22 CoL L. Rav. 564 (1922).
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was stolen on the way to the carrier's office, recovery was denied; "8
but where the illegal feature was the fact that a rebate had been agreed
upon, the shipper was allowed to recover for negligent injuries to the
shipment. 19 Certainly common sense applauds the distinction in the extreme case. If, for example, a carrier accepted goods for the shipment
of which there was no tariff provision, and wilfully destroyed them or
refused to deliver them at all, it seems incredible that a court would
cling to the proposition that the shipper is absolutely precluded from
recovery because of the illegality of the shipment. Similarly, a carrier
should not be successful in defending an action for injury to the shipment
on the ground that the contract was illegal because the shipper had been
overcharged.
Effect of Good Faith.-The shipper's actual knowledge of the filed
rates and tariffs is generally immaterial; he is conclusively presumed to
know them as a matter of public record.20 Earlier cases expressed some
sympathy for the shipper, holding that he could not be expected to wade
through the maze of tariff regulations each time he used the railroad, and
that good faith on his part in that respect would be given effect.2 1 Although it may be true that the tomes of tariffs are incomprehensible to
the shipper who has occasion to use them infrequently, it is equally true
that there could be no kind of workable doctrine based on a rule of knowledge or belief; the difficulties of enforcing the Act would be staggering.
Effect on Duty of Care.-Suits by shippers, to collect damages for
injury to goods in the hands of the carrier, can be successfully defended
by showing that the degree of care, or act of care, which the shipper
claims ought to have been observed or performed by the carrier, would
have been illegal in itself. For example, in Jackson Perkins Co. v. Mushroom Transportation Co., 2 2 a shipper sent some perishable plants with

signs attached to them reading, "Protect from Heat and Cold." The
shipper did nothing to protect them, and as a result the plants were
killed while in the carrier's hands. The carrier showed that his tariffs
did not provide for such a service, and that it would therefore have
been illegal for him to have provided it. Thus the carrier was able to
escape liability without proof of the exercise of due care, or a showing
23
that the freeze was an act of God for which he was not responsible.
The effectiveness of a defense under Section 6 is pointed up by this case:
there was no need for an argument that heating this shipper's plants would
have been an undue preference or a discrimination. The filed tariffs
specify every service which the carrier may render, and the rates at
which he may render them; a service which is not specified, or which is
18. American Ry. Exp. Co. v. American Trust Co., supra note 17. See also
Payne v. Bassett, supra note 17 (recovery denied for loss of goods for shipment of
which there was no tariff).
19. Merchant's Cotton Press Co. v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 151 U. S. 368
(1894) ; Adams Express Co. v. Darden, 286 Fed. 61 (6th Cir. 1923), aff'd and cert.
denied, 265 U. S. 265 (1924).
20. Kirby v. Chicago & Alton R. R., 225 U. S. 155 (1912).
21. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros., 268 Fed. 22 (5th Cir. 1920), rev'd
on other grounds, 256 U. S. 566 (1921) (although telegraph rates were not filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission, they were a matter of public record) ; PondDecker Lumber Co. v. Spencer, 86 Fed. 846 (5th Cir. 1898); Kirby v. Chicago &
Alton R. R., 242 Ill. 418, 90 N. E. 252 (1909), rev'd, 225 U. S. 155 (1912).
22. 351 Pa. 583, 41 A. 2d 635 (1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 733 (1945).
23. See also Clemons Produce Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 203 Mo. App. 100,
219 S. W. 660 (1920).
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rendered at the wrong rate, is illegal and the carrier has no duty to
render it.
That the kind of recovery sought is illegal, is also a good defense.
Therefore in a suit to recover the goods shipped, where there has been
an illegal agreement that the shipper pay less than tariff, or that the
carrier absorb storage charges, the carrier can set up the defense that
he is required by Section 3 not to deliver the goods unless and until all
charges thereon have been paid.2 4 Closely allied is the defense that
the measure of recovery sought would be prohibited under the Interstate Commerce Act; thus where there is a provision in the tariff that
there will be a limitation of liability in view of the rate paid, recovery
beyond this amount is not allowed, on the theory that to allow it would
in effect discriminate in favor of this particular shipper. 25
It would seem, then, that the carriers' rights of private contract
have been abolished by the Interstate Commerce Act. The parties may
not alter by special agreement the terms of the tariffs, for this would
be in direct violation of the spirit of Sections 2 and 3 and the letter of
Section 6. In effect, it may be said that the carrier has available certain
printed contracts, specific as to the kind of service to be rendered and
the rate at which it is to be done. Either the shipper picks one of
these forms off the rack, or he has no contract at all with the carrier.
The consequence, when "suit is brought on a contract other than one provided in the tariffs, is just as if no contract existed.
Requirement that the Carrier Collect the Filed Rate.-The carrier
must, under Section 6 (7), collect the full tariff as filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. 26 So mechanical has been the interpretation of this rule that results which are extremely hard on the shipper,
and contrary to the equities of the situation, have been reached. A
shipper who relies, for example, in a cost-plus contract, on a rate misquoted to him by the carrier must nevertheless pay the filed rate, in a
suit by the carrier for the difference: to allow the shipper to pay a different rate would not only violate Section 6 (7), but would discriminate
27
in his favor against those shippers who paid the higher filed rate.
Again, as in the case of the conclusive presumption that the shipper
knows the filed rate,28 earlier cases were inclined to go into the equities
of the situation, and to allow the shipper to resist recovery on the ground
that he had relied to his detriment on this misquoted rate. 9 In the case
24. Brandon v. Lichty, 133 Fla. 520, 182 So. 897 (1938) ; Church v. Minneapolis
& St. L. Ry., 14 S. D. 443, 85 N. W. 1001 (1901) (agreement to pay reduced rate) ;
Hanaman v. Liberty Trucking Co., 242 Wis. 92, 7 N. W. 2d 609 (1943) (agreement
that shipper need not pay storage charges).
25. Christensen v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 62 S. D. 264, 252 N. W.
738 (1934). A different result is reached where the limitation of liability is in consideration of an illegal reduced rate: Ward v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 158 Mo. 226, 58
S. W. 28 (1900). Where the defense of any higher recovery being discriminatory is
not raised, the cases seem to turn on the question of presumptive or actual knowledge
of the limitation: Jones v. Great Northern Ry., 68 Mont. 231, 217 Pac. 673 (1923).
26. Section 6(7) provides, in part, ".

.

. nor shall any carrier charge or demand

or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for such transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in connection therewith, between
the points named in such tariffs than the rates, fares, and charges which are specified
in the tariff filed and in effect at the time. .

.

."

See, e. g., Strawberry Growers'

Selling Co. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 31 F. 2d 947 (5th Cir. 1929).
27. Pettibone v. Richardson, 126 F. 2d 969 (2d Cir. 1942) ; cf. Standard Rice Co.
v. Southern Pac. R. R., 139 F. 2d 93 (5th Cir. 1943). An inadvertent (or even an intentional) misstatement of the rate will not bind the carrier: Atlantic Coast Line Ry.
v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, 30 F. Supp. 726 (W. D. Va. 1939).
28. See note 20 supra.
29. Pond-Decker Lumber Co. v. Spencer, 86 Fed. 846 (5th Cir. 1898).

98

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Voi.98

of a rate -that has been misprinted, the carrier still must collect the filed,
misprinted rate, whether it is greater or less than the rate that was intended to be printed.30 Theoretically, this wooden rule does no harm
to the shipper, for he has recourse to the Interstate Commerce Commission to have the rate set aside, and a reparation made,31 if the misprinted
rate is too high. The carrier, too, may apply to the Interstate Commerce
Commission to change the rate.32 But it would seem better to allow
the misprint and the rate correction to be proven, and thus to avoid
the circuity of action, expense, and injustice.
Compromises and Counterclaims.-Similarly,a compromise of a claim
is not binding on the carrier.3 3 For example, in a suit by the carrier to
collect the filed rate, where the shipper sets up an accord and satisfaction for less than the filed rate, the carrier may answer that a compromise is in its nature discriminatory, and further that it violates the provision that the carrier must collect the full rate.34 This view, in addition to following the letter of Section 6 (7), seems to be best, for discrimination in favor of some shippers would be relatively simple in this
situation.
Perhaps the most doubtful application of the principle that the carrier must collect the filed rate is the rule, still adhered to in some jurisdictions, that a shipper may not interpose a counterclaim by way of
set-off or recoupment, to an action to collect the filed rate.8 5 Although there
is a wide divergence of views on this point, many courts have said that
to allow any diminution of the carrier's recovery would be discriminatory:
if the shipper's counterclaim were successful, the shipper would not be
paying the filed rate for the service furnished, a direct violation of Section 6 (7). 8 6 The shipper may, however, bring a separate action and
recover on what would have been his counterclaim; thus the result is
the same in dollars and cents. Since there seems to be no more opportunity for collusion on a counterclaim than in a separate action, the basic
reason for the rule that the carrier must collect the filed rate disappears.
In Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Lindell,3 7 the Supreme Court held that where
a state statute 3 8 precluded defendant from later bringing a separate action
30. Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. v. Magnolia Provision Co., 20 F. 2d 384 (S. D.
Tex. 1927) (by implication), aff'd, 26 F. 2d 72 (5th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U. S.
620 (1928) (shipper may collect the difference between the rate he paid, and the lower
misprinted rate).
31. See Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. v. Magnolia Provision Co., 26 F. 2d 72, 73
(5th Cir. 1928).
32. Ibid.
33. Alabama & Great So. R. R. v. Brown, 25 Ala. App. 243, 144 So. 124 (1932);
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Cameron, 280 Pa. 458, 124 Atl. 638 (1924). A carrier may not
compromise a claim founded upon an illegal contract: Holt Lumber Co. v. Duluth,
S. S. & A. Ry., 206 Wis. 77, 238 N. W. 839 (1931). Nor may a shipper enforce an
agreement to compromise a claim for an amount in excess of the limited liability set
forth in the contract of affreightment: Donohoo Horse & Mule Co. v. Missouri, K. &
T. R. R., 95 Kan. 681, 149 Pac. 436 (1915). Some cases indicate, however, that a
claim may be compromised in the carrier's favor: U. S. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 18 F. 2d
299 (E. D. Wash. 1927).
34. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Cameron, 280 Pa. 458, 124 AtI. 638 (1924).
35. Pennsylvania R. R. v. South Carolina Produce Ass'n, 25 F. 2d 315 (E. D.
S. C. 1928) ; New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. California Fruit Growers' Exchange,
125 Conn. 241, 5 A. 2d 353 (1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 567 (1939). Contra: New
York Central R. R. v. DeMay, 154 Misc. 373, 277 N. Y. Supp. 17 (Sup. Ct. 1935)
frelying on Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Lindell, 281 U. S. 14 (1930)]; Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. v. Pioneer Grain Corp., 26 F. 2d 90 (D. Minn. 1928).
36. See note 26 mipra.
37. 281 U. S.14 (1930).
38. CAL. CODE CIv. P. § 439 (Deering, 1941).
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if he did not counterclaim, defendant could counterclaim against the carrier,
without violating the rule requiring the carrier to collect the filed rate.
Recognizing the conflict of authority on the point, the court said that
counterclaim, unlike compromise, was not open to the objection of being
collusive since it was under judicial control.3 9 Even in jurisdictions where
the counterclaim is not compulsory, the same result is desirable, in view of
the reason for the rule prohibiting any diminution of the filed rate, i. e., the
danger of discrimination.
WAIVER OF DEFENSES

Statute of Limitations.-Various periods of limitation for bringing
suit appear either in the filed tariffs or in the Interstate Commerce Act.
These must be strictly observed, and the carrier and shipper may not
agree on a different limitation than that provided.40 To extend the statute
of limitations in a claim against the carrier would discriminate in favor
of the shipper; to shorten it would discriminate against him. So fearful have some courts been of discrimination in this field that the defense
may be raised by demurrer in some jurisdictions where in other cases
it is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. 41 Again, this strictness is a fairly modern development, earlier cases holding
that dilatory
42
tactics on the part of the carrier will waive the defense.
Requirement of Written Orders or Notice of Claim.-Where the
tariffs call for written orders for cars, or specify that orders to divert a
shipment be in writing, these requirements cannot be waived, and in a
suit for damages for non-performance of an oral order, the carrier may
43
defend successfully by showing that no written order was ever given.
Neither can the tariff regulations requiring written notice of certain types
of claims against the carrier within a certain time be waived. 44 Even in a
case where the shipper had given verbal notice within the time limit, and the
carrier had started to investigate the claim, a defense was successfully
interposed to the shipper's suit, on the ground that written notice had
not been filed within the specified time. 45 The carrier could not waive
the requirement by acting on the claim.
As courts have proceeded to apply the rules of the Interstate Commerce Act literally and unbendingly, some situations have been condoned
which are far more susceptible to discriminatory practices than those
which are condemned. In Empire Box Corp. of Stroudsburg v. Dela39. 281 U. S. 14, 18 (1930).
40. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Judson Freight Forwarding Co., 49 F. Supp. 789
(S. D. Cal. 1943), aff'd mib isam. National Carloading Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S. F.

Ry.. 150 F. 2d 210 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Cohen v. Texas & N. 0. R. R., 303 IIl. App. 606,

25 N. E. 2d 562 (1940); Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Virginian Ry., 126 W.
Va. 626, 29 S. E. 2d 471 (1944). Nor may the shipper waive the statute of limitations when the carrier sues after it has run, but before limit set by an illegal agreement to extend the statute: Pennsylvania R. R. v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 320
U. S. 356 (1943).
41. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk W. Ry., 236 U. S. 662 (1914).
42. Donohoo Horse & Mule Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. R. R., 95 Kan. 681, 149 Pac.
436 (1915).
43. Davis v. Henderson, 266 U. S. 92 (1924) (verbal orders for cars); Falmouth Co-Op Marketing Ass'n v. Pennsylvania R. R., 237 Mich. 406, 212 N. W. 84
(1927) ; Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co. v. C. M. Kopp Co., 12 Wash. 2d 146, 120
P. 2d 845 (1942) (verbal diversion order).
44. Mt. Arbor Nurseries v. American Ry. Express Co., 221 Mo. App. 241, 300
S. W. 1051 (1928) ; Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Virginian Ry., 126 W. Va.
626, 29 S. E. 2d 471 (1944).
45. Mt. Arbor Nurseries v. American Ry. Express Co., supra note 44.
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ware, L. & W. R. R.,46 the shipper and carrier had for several years
been using the telephone where the tariffs required written notice. The
carrier would call the shipper to inform him that a car consigned to
him had arrived, and that the carrier was ready to deliver it to the shipper's siding. The siding was frequently congested, and at the request of
the shipper, the carrier would keep the car until the shipper telephoned
to say that space was available. Over this period, the shipper paid the
carrier nearly $10,000 in demurrage. The shipper then sued to recover
it, claiming that the carrier was not entitled to demurrage until written
notice of its readiness to deliver was given. Giving judgment for the
shipper, the court recognized that its ruling might open the way to discrimination, but stated, "Nevertheless, we think that the undoubted opportunity for abuse is not a justification for disregarding the canon of rigid
adherence to the letter, which the Supreme Court has adopted in general towards published tariffs and their attendant rules." 47 Under this
decision, it would be absurdly simple for a carrier to favor a shipper
by using the telephone instead of writing. The carrier then would never
be entitled to recover demurrage, and if the shipper pays any, he can
get it back. Since the basis of the tariff rule requiring written notice is
prevention of discrimination, a sounder decision would have required
the carrier to retain the demurrage charges, once the shipper had recognized his obligation to pay, and in fact had paid. Such a decision would,
it is suggested, effectuate the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act
by giving the carrier the charges due it, since on the facts of the case
there seemed to be no doubt about the carrier's right to the demurrage
except for the question of written notice.
PASSENGERS' ACTIONS

An apparent exception to the rule of "no contract-no recovery"
is made in the case of persons riding on the railroad on an illegal pass,
an expired ticket, or some other form of inadequate payment for transportation. It is the carrier's duty to eject persons from the train who
are riding illegally, whether the passenger merely refuses to pay his fare, 48
tenders a limited ticket not good on that particular train,4 9 or a nontransferable ticket to which he is not entitled,5 0 is using an official pass
while not on official duty,8 ' or attempts to use a ticket which has expired.8 2 Since such is the duty, generally no damages will be allowed
for the mere fact of ejection. 3 To allow the passenger to ride would
be a prohibited discriminati6n in favor of him. From the atmosphere of
the cases involving illegal contracts other than contracts of carriage by
passengers, it might be deduced that the passenger riding illegally would
encounter the same obstacles to recovery as the shipper does; that whatever status he had on the train, trespasser or licensee, he would not be a
46. 171 F. 2d 389 (2d Cir. 1948).
47. Emphasis added.
48. See Louisville & N. R. R. v. Watson, 201 Ky. 108, 114, 255 S. W. 1056, 1059
(1923). Also, where the passenger tenders a ticket for part of the distance, thus in
effect refusing to pay his fare: Ligon v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 184 Mo. App. 187,
168 S. W. 647 (1914).
49. Foley v. Chicago Gt. W. Ry., 205 Iowa 72, 217 N. W. 563 (1928).
50. See Robostelli v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 33 Fed. 796, 798 (C. C. S. D.

N. Y. 1888).
51. By analogy, although no cases in point have been found.
52. Grogan v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 39 W. Va. 415, 19 S. E. 563 (1894).
53. Foley v. Chicago Gt. W. Ry., 205 Iowa 72, 217 N. W. 563 (1928) ; Ligon v.
St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 184 Mo. App. 187, 168 S. W. 647 (1914).
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passenger, since there is no contract between him and the carrier that
could give rise to the relationship. The overwhelming majority view,
however, has been that the relationship can be created independently of
any contract, viz., if the rider uses the pass, or inadequate ticket, in good
faith, and the conductor or other authorized official accepts it, the relationship will arise, carrying the concomitant duty of care.5 4 It may be
argued that this rule is, then, no exception to the "no contract-no recovery" rule, but just another way in which the relationship, normally created by contract, can arise. Certainly, however, it is an exception to the
rule that a carrier may not legally do anything not provided for in the
tariffs. 5 Analytically, the situation is difficult to distinguish from that
of the shipper suing on an illegal contract. The discriminatory feature
of the transaction is the same in each case: the shipper or passenger has
been accorded a service not available to the public at large. In the shipper's case, this feature voids the whole transaction, and prevents recovery on any occurrence arising from the transaction. In the passenger's
case, the rule is that the illegal feature does not prevent recovery for a
tort arising from the transaction. However one feels about the logic of
the exception, it is probably the product of a feeling that the social value
of allowing injured passengers to recover against railroads outweighs
any detriment thereby done to the policy behind the Interstate Commerce
Act to prevent discriminations. Primarily, at least, the Act was directed
against freight discriminations.
CONCLUSION

The various "discrimination" sections of the Interstate Commerce
Act have been used surprisingly successfully by the carriers as defenses
to actions by shippers. Some of the decisions, such as those which deny
a shipper any recovery when he has relied on a misquoted rate,56 seem
contrary to usual equitable concepts. It is prima facie undesirable that
the carrier can evade obligations by asserting that he acted illegally in
entering into them. On the other hand, contracts which contravene strong
public policy have always been unenforceable. The policy of the Interstate Commerce Act is very strong. Its public character is alluded to
frequently in the decisions. Courts have expressed the view many times
that it was enacted to benefit primarily the public at large,57 by securing
shippers against ruin and monopoly, and preserving competition and fair
trade practices. Thus the basis for not enforcing these illegal contracts
is clear.
On the question of damages, however, there seems no necessity for
such rigid interpretation. Even if a given contract violates the Act, it
does not follow a priori that no damages should be recoverable under
any circumstances." The tendency in other fields of law to adopt a realistic rather than a doctrinal approach should be carried over into this area.
54. Southern Pac. Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601 (1913) (illegal pass) ; Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. v. Burton, 62 F. 2d 110 (4th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S.
617 (1932) (expired ticket) ; Robostelli v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 33 Fed. 796
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1888) (non-transferable commutation ticket); Graves v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 342 Mo. 542, 118 S. W. 2d 787 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 617
(1938) (plaintiff riding as caretaker in horse car). Where an employee is riding on
a pass in pursuance of his official duties, his status is that of a servant, not a passenger:
Tharp v. Central of Ga. Ry., 31 Ga. App. 198, 121 S. E. 592 (1924).
55. The tariff may be changed only by ICC or court order, not by act of the carrier alone.
56. Pettibone v. Richardson, 126 F. 2d 969 (2d Cir. 1942).
57. See cases cited note 5 stupra.
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So far there is little sign of such a development. Perhaps the courts
have felt that by denying the shippers any recovery in these cases, they
would force the latter to become vigilant and better informed in tariff
matters. In the meantime, however, the remedy seems extremely harsh.
A possible solution for the case where the illegality is an undercharge or agreement for a rebate for a service provided for in the tariffs,
would be to allow the carrier a set-off in the amount of the difference.
This would give the carrier the rate it should have collected, and there
would then be no objection to the shipper's recovering on the contract
for damage to a shipment. When a service is rendered which is not
allowed by the tariffs,5 8 it is difficult to suggest any such panacea. The defect is no mere discrepancy in rate, easily adjusted, but an absolute prohibition against rendering the service. If recovery were allowed, the court
would be presenting the opportunity to a carrier, desiring to discriminate,
to perform the service for a preferred shipper, the latter secure in the
knowledge that he would be able to collect should damage occur, even if
the carrier were to resist the claim. The courts have allowed an exception in cases of personal injuries and in some property damage cases,
but it seems highly unlikely, in view of the trend of the decisions, that
further change is likely in the near future.
P.M.W.
State Death Taxes: Utilization and Apportionment of the Federal
Estate Tax Credit
When the federal estate tax was enacted in 1916, death taxes had
long been established in many states.1 Considerable opposition by the
states to the presence of the federal government in the field of death taxation, developing steadily, finally led to the crediting system in 1924.2
Under this system, the taxpayer may offset state death taxes actually paid
against 80% of the basic federal estate tax. To secure the addiHonal revenue thus made available to them, almost all the states have enacted supplementary death taxes, commonly called slack taxes.8 This Note will
consider first some problems which the taxpayer who desires to claim
the federal credit must face. Secondv. it will discuss the apportionment
of the revenue secured by the slack tax among the states in which a decedent's property lies. There has as yet been relatively little legislation on the latter point. No treatment of constitutional problems will be
included, 4 nor are "domicile" and "situs" considered analytically.
58. E. g., Payne v. Bassett, 235 S. W. 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), 22 COL. L.
REV. 564, 567 (1922).

1. The inheritance tax of 1898, a wartime measure, was repealed in 1902. 30
448 (1898). It is fully discussed in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900).
2. 43 STAT. 303 (1924). See INT. REV. CODE § 813(b). The legislative history
is reviewed in Perkins, State Action Under the FederalEstate Credit Clause, 13 N. C.
L. REv. 271 (1935).
3. For the economic effect upon three great commercial states, Massachusetts,
New York, and Pennsylvania, see Oakes, The Federal Offset and the American Death
Tax System, 54 HARV. JOURN. OF EcoN. 566, 573 (1940).
4. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (1927) (federal credit proviso upheld). See
also cases upholding the constitutionality of the state slack statutes, e. g., Hagood v.
Daughton, 195 N. C. 811, 143 S. E. 841 (1928); Knowle's Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145
Atl. 797 (1928). But cf. Charlestown National Bank v. Fox, 116 W. Va. 487, 182
S. E. 91 (1935).
5. In connection with the domicile problem see the Uniform Act on Arbitration
and Compromise recently passed by the Pennsylvania legislature. PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 72, § 2451 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
STAT.
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SLACK TAX STATUTORY TYPEs
Preliminarily, consideration must be given the language of the different statutes. In most cases, the state has secured the difference between
its own inheritance tax and 80% of the federal basic estate tax by enacting
a supplementary estate tax.6 Some states have simplified their death tax
structure by drafting a new single tax patterned after the federal estate
tax, with provision for absorbing the full 807 credit.7 In a few states,
where previously there had been no death tax, an estate levy has been
adopted solely to secure the credit revenue.8 Slack taxes are not in
effect in several jurisdictions, including Illinois; Nevada is the only state
without a death tax of any kind.9
Taxation of Non-residents.-The slack tax is usually made applicable
to both residents' and non-residents' estates.' 0 The value of the property
of a non-resident situated in the taxing jurisdiction generally provides the
measure of the tax, which equals the portion of the federal credit attributable
to the local estate. A few states exempt intangibles of non-residents."
Taxation of Residents.-About a third of the states apply the slack
tax only to residents' estates.' 2 Such statutes provide that the tax shall
be the amount represented by the federal credit less deductions for other
state death taxes paid.' 3 Where several states apply this formula to a
given estate, the domiciliary state takes the whole slack tax. In such a
case, the tax would seem to fall on extra-territorial tangibles, a normally
prohibited result.' 4 Certainly it could not be explained as a mere progressive rate of taxation upon the local estate, measured by the existence
of extra-territorial property, sanctioned by Maxwell v. Bugbee.15
The Pennsylvania Slack Tax.-Prior to 1943 the Pennsylvania tax
was strictly supplementary to the transfer inheritance tax. Property
which was not taxable under the normal inheritance tax, though within
the scope of the basic federal estate tax, was likewise excluded in ascertaining the slack tax.' 6 This was undesirable, since it prevented the state
from realizing the full benefit marked off for it by the 80% credit provision. In 1943 Pennsylvania adopted a statutory formula explicitly de6. E. g., California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin.
7. N. Y. TAx LAW § 249m; OKLA. STAT., tit. 68, § 989b (1941).
8. This type of statute is in effect in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and
Mississippi, although Arkansas and Mississippi previously had inheritance taxes.
9. Nevada repealed its inheritance tax law in 1925 and since then has had no
death tax whatsoever.
10. E. g., California, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York, Texas,

Washington.

11. This type of statute is in effect in Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. The District of Columbia and New York also exempt
intangibles of nonresidents, except where they have acquired a "business situs."
12. The leading states in this category are Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
13. E. g., Mont. Laws 1943, c. 236, § 1, has a proviso to the effect that the allowance for other state death taxes may not exceed the total death taxes levied upon
the same transfer under Montana law. N. H. REV. LAWS, c. 88, § 1 (1942), limits
the allowance to those state taxes paid on account of the property of the decedent
within New Hampshire. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 115 (Michie, 1942).
14. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
15. 250 U. S. 525 (1919) ; Lowndes, Rate and Measure in Jurisdiction to TaxAftermath of Maxwell v. Bugbee, 49 HARV. L. Rlv. 756 1936).
16. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72, § 2303 (Purdon, 1931), Commonwealth v. Davis'
Estate, 345 Pa. 284, 26 A. 2d 915 (1942) (appointed property included in the estate
of donee for federal estate tax purposes cannot be taken into account in measuring the
slack tax). For a like result, see Highfield v. Delaware Trust Co., 34 Del. 306, 152
Atl. 124 (1930).
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fining the slack tax as the excess of the allowable credit over the net
state inheritance tax and other state death taxes. 17 Such a formula does
not add to the taxpayer's burden; if the Commonwealth does not collect
the full credit, it goes to the federal taxing authority.18 The statute is
designated to stay in effect as long as the federal revenue act provides
for a credit to the states. It has always applied only to residents' estates.
Unfortunately, as it now stands, the statute deprives the estate of any
incentive to secure the discount for prompt payment of the normal inheritance tax.19
UTILIZATION OF THE CREDIT BY THE TAXPAYER

Generally the slack tax is imposed whether or not a credit is claimed

by the taxpayer against the basic federal estate tax.2 0 Where no effort
is made by the state taxing officials to collect the slack tax until after
the expiration of the federal time limit, a Pennsylvania decision indicates
that the estate may be relieved from liability. 21 The inaction or negligence of the executor, however, will not of itself defeat the tax.22 Many
statutes impose a mandatory duty on the executor to file a copy of the
23
final determination of the federal estate tax with the state authorities.
No credit is allowed by the federal government for state death taxes paid
on the transfer of property not includible in the gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes.24 The taxpayer, therefore, must observe carefully
both federal and state requirements in order to utilize fully the allowable
credit.
Vested Remainders.-The taxpayer's most difficult problem in securing the benefit of the 80% federal credit arises when the decedent has
created future interests by his own testamentary act.2 5 The Internal
Revenue Code specifies that the credit for state taxes shall be allowed
only where payment of such taxes was made within four years after the
filing of the estate tax return.2 6 State statutes usually provide for ad27
vance payment of the normal inheritance tax on vested remainders,
thereby allowing the taxpayer the benefit of the federal credit provision.
It is apparent that the normal inheritance tax must first be ascertained before the taxing authorities are in a position to compute the slack tax due
17. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72, § 2303 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
18. Howard's Estate, 33 Del. County R. 412 (0. C., Pa. 1945), where it was
pointed out that Markle's Estate, 311 Pa. 472, 166 Ati. 884 (1933), no longer applies.
19. Ibid.
20. E. g., In re Thalmann's Estate, 177 Misc. 1055, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 695 (Surr.
Ct. 1941) (except in those situations where because of contingent interests the slack
tax cannot be computed, since the normal inheritance tax is unknown).
21. See Caflisch's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 282, 284 (0. C., Erie County 1934).
22. E. g., In re Thalmann's Estate, 177 Misc. 1055, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 695 (Surr. Ct.
1941) ; In re Nieman, 230 Wis. 23, 283 N. W. 452 (1939).
23. E. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72, § 2303 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
24. Moore v. Comm'r, 21 B. T. A. 279 (1930) ; Brock v. Comm'r, 16 B. T. A.
1348 (1929).
25. INT. REv. CODE §927. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.79(b) (1948),
which provides for the postponement of the tax on a reversion or remainder upon the
posting of a bond where the future interest was in the decedent's gross estate.
26. INT. REv. CODE § 813(b). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.9 (1942).
27. E. .., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72, § 2304 (Purdon, 1931) : ".

.

. the tax shall

be assessed upon the value of the estate at the time the right of possession accrues
to the owner, but the owner may pay the tax at any time prior to his coming into possession. In such cases the tax shall be assessed on the value of the estate at the time
of payment of the tax after deducting the value of the life estate.

19491

NOTES

the state. Likewise, the taxpayer can only offset both the inheritance tax
and the slack tax when actual payment of such taxes is made within the
federal time limit.
As an example of the considerations involved, suppose a testamentary
trust of a "gross estate" 28 of $600,000, consisting of a life estate in the
widow, with vested remainders in named children. Against the federal
credit of $14,000 the taxpayer may offset any state death taxes actually
paid upon this transfer. If we capitalize the value of the widow's present
right to income for life at $200,000, the remainders are presently worth
$400,000. In Pennsylvania, the norital inheritance tax upon the life estate
would be $4,000.29 In addition, the remaindermen may pay at once $8,000,
a tax based upon the present value of the remainders.30 If, however, they
choose to defer payment of the tax until the death of the life tenant, the
remainder will then be worth $600,000, and they will have to pay $12,000
in normal inheritance taxes. Additionally, since the time within which
the federal credit may be secured is only four years, waiting for the life
tenant to die may deprive the estate of the right to recoup the $10,000 of
federal credit still unclaimed. 3 1 It will usually be best, therefore, to pay
the $14,000 to the state at once, $4,000 on the life estate, $8,000 on the
vested remainder, and $2,000 as the slack tax.
Contingent Remainders.-Where the remaindermen are not ascertainable until the death of the life tenant, the inheritance tax, which depends normally on the degree of relationship of the beneficiary to the testator, cannot be assessed. In such cases, therefore, most jurisdictions
defer payment of the tax until the remainder vests in possession. There
are, however, many statutory provisions for a compromise procedure
whereby a final tax may be fixed at once on such contingent remainders.3 2
In this way, the federal credit can be secured by the taxpayer.
In some states the executor may pay a tax on the contingent remainders, at the death of the testator, at the highest possible rate and
the remaindermen will be entitled to a refund if a lower rate is applicable
when the remainder vests.33 It is doubtful, however, whether the imposition of such a tentative tax will be considered "payment" under the Internal Revenue Code so as to enable the taxpayer to claim credit therefor.3 4 The federal courts have interpreted the words "actually paid" in
the federal credit proviso as meaning final payment of state death taxes
and have disallowed "deposits" covering taxes to be assessed in the future,
on the theory that the deposit is merely security for subsequent payment
and not equivalent to payment under the Code.3 5 It is best, therefore,
for the executor to use the compromise procedure fixing a final inheritance
tax upon the contingent future interest. This insures the benefit of the
federal credit and gives the estate the use of the money which the state
28. The term "gross estate" is used as defined in INT.
29. PA. STAT. AN., tit. 72, § 2302 (Purdon, 1931).

REV. CODE

§ 811.

30. See note 27 .,pra; Twining's Estate, 61 Mont. County L. R. 311 (0. C., Pa.,
1945).
31. Cf. In re Reynold's Estate, 359 Pa. 616, 60 A. 2d 57 (1948).
32. E. g., N. Y. TAX LAW § 249-V; PA. STAT. ANi., tit. 72, § 2452 (Purdon,
Supp. 1947).

33. For typical provisions, see CAL. REv. & TAX CoDE § 14411 (Deering, 1944).
See also ALL-STATE CCH INH., EST. & GIFT TAX SERV. 12110-B (7th ed. 1944).
34. Since the highest rate of tax is paid in cash and'not merely by posting a bond
for security, it would seem that the federal government would at least give credit for
the lowest rate of tax applicable to the remainder interest.
35. E. g., Smith v. Comm'r, 59 F. 2d 533 (7th Cir. 1932).
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treasury would normally hold as advance payment based on the highestrate of taxation.
APPORTIONMENT OF THE FEDERAL CREDIT AMONG SEVERAL STATES

The General Formula.-When an estate lies within several jurisdictions, each of which applies the slack tax to non-residents, a problem arises
in which considerations both of power and comity are involved. The general proposition of law is that each state is entitled to a portion of the
federal credit equivalent to the proportionate value of the property within
its control. Since the federal estate tax is progressive, and covers the
entire estate, the 80% credit is also founded on a progressive rate measured by the whole estate. Each state's portion, therefore, derives its
measure from a tax on the local property at a rate governed by the
totality of the estate.3 6
The operational mechanics of such a statutory formula are usually in
three steps: (1) determine the ratio which the value of property in the
taxing jurisdiction bears to the entire estate; (2) multiply the total amount
of the allowable credit by the computed ratio to determine the amount
of credit allowable to the state; (3) subtract the amount of the primary
death taxes from the credit to arrhie at the slack tax due. Most jurisdictions impose a slack tax on b6th non-residents and residents and apply
this same formula to each.3 7
Tangible Property.-Since 1905 it has been unquestioned law that
tangibles, personalty and realty both, may not be taxed extra-territorially,
regardless of the location of the decedent's domicile.38
Slack taxation
must be guided by this restriction. Ideally, then, a state may not participate in the federal credit beyond the extent that the tangibles within
its borders contribute to the total value of an estate composed solely of
tangibles. But each state is free to adopt its own valuation procedures,
and its own formula for determining the situs of movables.3 9 Indeed, a
jealous spirit of independence has made cooperation developments annoyingly slow. In a few states the rates and valuation methods of the federal
40
government have been adopted as a uniform standard.
As an example of a typical apportionment, we may take a total net
taxable estate of $1,000,000 (excluding exemption), composed entirely
of tangible property, distributed equally in California, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas, and left by a resident of Pennsylvania. The 80%
credit against the basic federal estate tax is $38,800. 4 1 Since a fourth of
the property lies in each state, we would expect the credit to be divided
equally. Texas and California have similar statutes, using the proportionate basis, and each would collect a fourth, or $9,700.42 The Texas
formula has been upheld by the state supreme court even where 43other
states have already collected more than the total allowable credit.
New York, however, might receive only $5,200. Although its slack
tax provision, read literally, seems designed to secure a pro rata share, a
surrogate court has held recently that the credit must be computed at a
36. See note 15 supra.
37. E. g., TEX. Crv. STAT., art. 7144a (Vernon, 1939).
38. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).

39. See ALL-STATE CCH INH., EST. & GiFT TAx Smv. 2560 (7th ed. 1944). See
also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota,
322 U. S. 292, 301 (1944).
40. See note 9 supra.
41. INT. REV. CoDE §§810, 813(b).

42. CAL. REv. & TAX CoDE § 13441 (Deering, 1944)
43. Simco v. Shirk, 146 Tex. 259, 206 S. W. 2d 221 (1947).
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rate which takes into account only the portion of the estate located within
New York."4 Because the federal rates are so sharply progressive, onefourth of the credit on an estate of $1,000,000 is $9,700, whereas the total
credit of a $250,000 estate is only $5,200.
The Pennsylvania tax applies only to residents, and amounts to the
excess, if any, of the total federal credit over all death duties paid to any
state. Since the three other states in the hypothetical case have collected
only $24,600, Pennsylvania would receive $14,200, a result which would
seem to be forbidden as extra-territorial taxation of tangibles.
Intangible Property.-Since there is no constitutional immunity to
multi-state taxation of intangibles,45 the apportionment problem must depend largely upon reciprocity agreements for its solution. Many statutes
do provide for reciprocity in favor of the domiciliary state; the effectiveness of these agreements must depend chiefly upon comity, since they are
unenforceable in the federal courts. 46 One can readily construct a situation where at least three states could lay claim to death taxes upon the
entire estate. Suppose, for example, the case of a decedent, resident in
Pennsylvania, who creates a testamentary trust of shares in a Massachusetts corporation, to be administered by corporate trustees in New York.
The domiciliary state may tax the whole and claim the entire federal
credit. 47 Massachusetts may do the same by virtue of its power over the
corporate shares which constitute the corpus of the transfer. 48 New York,
finally, has equal power since the
transfer confers legal ownership on a
49
corporate trustee of its creation.
The practical intolerability of such an outcome has led increasingly
to the use of "compromises" among the taxing authorities. The division,
of the total to be collected will depend partly upon the varying rates of
normal inheritance taxes of each of the states involved. So far as the
division of federal credit for slack taxes is concerned, however, the state
with the highest death tax rates will be entitled to the least amount of
additional revenue, since it will already have collected more of the allowable credit. The amounts involved are usually not great relatively, and,
simplicity, as well as fairness, commends equality in the division as the
best solution. When agreement is reached, a formal instrument is drawn
in which each state undertakes that it will not collect further taxes in,
the matter.
Lump Sum Settlements of Federal Estate Taxes.-Disputes between
taxpayers and the federal taxing authorities as to the existence of tax
liability are sometimes settled for a lump sum without a definitive determination of the amount of the taxable estate involved. It has been argued
that since no separate basic federal estate tax is computed in such a case,
there should be no credit to the states. Nevertheless, in a case where
the settlement expressly negatived the existence of any deduction for
any purpose, the Texas Supreme Court held the estate liable for slack tax.5 0
44. In re Watson's Estate, 185 Misc. 735, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 443 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
45. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 373-74 (1939). It is important to.
note in this connection that the great bulk of the large estates are mainly composed
of intangible property in the form of stocks, bonds, bank deposits, and life insurance
policies.
.46. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1 (1939) (a state is unable to enforce
the reciprocal exemption statute of another in the federal courts). For a full treatment of reciprocity in operation, see Note, 26 IowA L. REv. 694 (1941).
47. Cf. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 3 (1928).
48. State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942).
49. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939).

50. State v. Weiss, 141 Tex. 303, 171 S. W. 2d 848 (1943).
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Here the state comptroller had computed the tax by ascertaining what
net total estate would produce, the lump sum in federal estate taxes due,
giving appropriate credit against the basic estate tax. An independent
valuation of the property involved might have produced a far greater
tax, but the by-passed questions of the applicability of the federal tax
would have had to be litigated. The court based its decision upon the
supremacy of the state in matters of death taxation within its jurisdiction,
concluding therefrom that the statute could not have intended to allow the
incidence of the tax to be changed by an agreement between the taxpayer
and the federal authorities. Where several states are involved in such a
situation, confusion may result unless all adopt the same standard of valuation of the property. 1
EVALUATION

The slack tax statutes have made state death tax structures considerably more complex. State revenues have been not inconsiderably augmented, but the expected trend towards uniformity in rates and valuation methods has not materialized. Perhaps one reason is the disingenuous organization of the federal tax itself, with the circuitous flummery
of the "basic" and "additional" estate taxes. 52 If the federal tax were
integrated and the credit to the states stabilized, 53 there might be some
stimulus toward similar integration by the states. Federal grants-in-aid
and federal sharing of taxes must be correlated with this problem.5 4
As to interstate jurisdictional conflicts, the state legislatures and administrative bodies must provide the solution. So far, interstate cooperation has been concerned largely with reciprocity in respect to intarigibles.
Increasing momentum is becoming evident, however.5 5 Uniformity should
be the keynote wherever possible. Uniformity requires that non-residents
be taxed as well as residents, with reciprocity provisions to exempt intangibles. In connection with tangibles, the Texas formula seems fairest,
and easiest of application. 6 The problem cannot be eliminated except by
numerous agreements and good faith. It is part of the price of our federal system of government.
M.K.G.

51. Some states have limited their discretion in valuation, both by statute and
administrative rulings, by agreeing to accept the federal valuation. But the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions are free to set their own valuation on the property
having a situs within their borders, notwithstanding that the allowable credit is based
on the federal valuation. See ALL-STATE CCH INr., EST. & G=FT TAX SERV. ff 1800E
(7th ed. 1944).
52. INT. REV. CODE § 813 (b).
53. It is worthy of note that in 1938 the Vinson Committee recommended a "simplification" of the federal rate structure which would have frozen the present distribution of the death tax field between the federal and state governments. H. R.
REP. No. 1147, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1938).
54. Although. there is no- Supreme Court decision directly involving the validity
of federal sharing of taxes, the cases upholding federal grants in aid would appear to
support the validity of such sharing. Cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S.
548 (1937) ; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S.619 (1937). See BLOUGH, THE RELATIVE
PLACE OF SUBVENTION AND TAx SHARING IN TAx RELATIONS AMONG GOVERNMENTAL
UNITS 83 et seq. (Tax Policy League 1938).
55. PROGRESS REPORT OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON CONFLICTING TAXATION

88 et seq. (1935).
56. See note 37 supra.

